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Southern Academic Review

A Student Journal of Scholarship

Volume Seventy

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2003
2002

Southern Academic Review (SAR) is published every spring by students of Birmingham-Southern College. It is funded by the Student Government Association and operates under the supervision of the Student Publications Board. *SAR* seeks to publish material of scholarly interest to the students and faculty of Birmingham-Southern college, and the editorial scope encompasses all disciplines. Fully annotated research papers and shorter essays receive equal consideration for publication. *SAR* accepts submissions from any currently enrolled student or alumnus of the college. No submission will be considered if it has been previously submitted for academic credit at an institution other than Birmingham-Southern. Although most of *SAR's* content consists of student work, submissions from Birmingham-Southern faculty and guest lecturers will also be considered for publication. Manuscripts should be sent to: Editor, *Southern Academic Review*, Box 549046, Birmingham-Southern College, Birmingham, Alabama 35254.

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Contents

Editorial	v
Recreating Christianity in Their Own Image: Duality and Affirmation of the Black Religious Identity <i>Evelyn Coleman</i>	2
Lincoln's Purposeful Faith During the Civil War <i>Daniel Tidwell</i>	11
Degrees of Suffering and Moral Perfection <i>Joseph John</i>	23
Misreading or Miswriting? The Author Carolyn Chute vs. The Readers of <i>The Beans of Egypt, Maine</i> <i>Katy Smith</i>	29
Erotophobia-Erotophilia: Individual Differences in Cognitive Processing <i>Joseph F. Chandler, Caroline K. Street, Michelle M. Hilgeman, & Lauren A. Harrington</i>	39
The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox and Bell's Inequality <i>Johannes Norrell</i>	53
German Foreign Policy Under Bismarck and Kaiser William II <i>Charles Roberts</i>	63
Fitzgerald at His Worst?: An Analysis of "The Offshore Pirate" <i>Jessica Kilgore</i>	77

Editorial

As a multi-disciplinary journal, *Southern Academic Review* presents the variety of student research conducted at Birmingham-Southern College as well as the interconnectedness of seemingly opposed disciplines. This issue begins with three articles dealing with conceptions and configurations of the Judeo-Christian God. The first, by Evelyn Coleman, examines the tenets and development of Black Liberation Theology, using texts by Martin Luther King, Jr. and Frederick Douglass to emphasize her points and substantiate her claims. Next, Daniel Tidwell's essay traces the changes in Abraham Lincoln's belief in God alongside the possible causes and implications of these changes. Completing the God-papers, Joseph John's critique of Robert Merrihew Adams looks at the possibility of an omni-benevolent God creating a world with unnecessary suffering.

Making the shift from notions of God to notions of authorial intent (not as far removed as one may initially think), Katy Smith's essay uses the controversy surrounding the critical reception and interpretation of Carolyn Chute's *The Beans of Egypt, Maine* to explore the locus of meaning within literary texts. Then, taking as a cue the issues of sexuality in Smith's paper, our focus turns to cognitive psychology and the question, examined by Joseph Chandler, Caroline K. Street, Michelle M. Hilgeman, and Lauren A. Harrington, of whether or not erotophobia and erotophilia affect cognitive reaction time. Johannes Norrell's article on the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen "paradox" and its (in)compatibility with J. S. Bell's notions of local systems in quantum mechanics keeps the journal in the realm of the sciences (though natural rather than social) before it shifts back to history and the differences between the foreign policy of Otto von Bismarck and Kaiser William II of Germany, as explained by Charles Roberts. For our final article, Jessica Kilgore works to save F. Scott Fitzgerald's short fiction from those critics who would "condescendingly" call it "'interesting'" while failing to acknowledge the complex social issues with which it deals.

Each essay in this issue serves as an example both of the type of scholarship currently being produced by Birmingham-Southern students and of the forms and formats of the disciplines represented. As a consequence of this last aspect of the journal, there are inconsistencies in style that have been retained as a subtle celebration of the diversity of a

publication such as this one. (After all, where else can you go from God to erotophobia in two steps?)

Finally, I would like to thank Brandon Lee for assisting in the publication of this issue and for managing the natural science submissions.

Recreating Christianity in Their Own Image: Duality and Affirmation of the Black Religious Identity

Evelyn Coleman

The Black American has historically endured an ambivalent relationship with the Christianity of the white church. For the slave, Christian hope was the only consolation white oppressors granted to make slavery's yoke less onerous, yet the cruel irony of a white church that largely overlooked, and even participated in, oppression sullied this hope with a dark hypocrisy. Some blacks willingly swallowed the pacifying medicine of white Christianity, which numbed them to the realities of oppression by assuring that freedom would be obtained in heavenly rewards for submission and obedience in this life. For others, white Christianity ate at the soul in such a way that the only respite was to denounce it entirely, claiming as Malcolm X did that Christianity was "acting as a handmaiden of the white community in its determination to keep the Negroes in a subservient position" (qtd. in Cone, *God of 3*). Many African Americans, though, could neither accept a glazed-eye Christianity that proclaimed a futuristically redeeming God while denying the humanity of the black people—or renounce altogether a Christianity that rendered a sweeter aftertaste to the bitter bile of oppression.

Thus, black Christians, participating in a religious institution that often ignored and even aggravated their social and legal oppression, experienced a disunity in their identity as both black and Christian. Frederick Douglass, in his autobiographical slave narrative, expresses this internal angst as he both entreates and doubts God within one despairing cry, "O God save me! God deliver me, Let me be free! Is there any God? Why am I a slave" (Douglass, *Narrative* 106-07). The struggle to resolve these tensions is present in Frederick Douglass's speech "What To a Slave Is the Fourth Of July?" and in Martin Luther King, Jr.'s "Letter from a Birmingham Jail," key texts from the two most salient eras of the black struggle. It is my contention that the irreconcilable duality represented in these texts and the resultant ambivalence of identity induced African-Americans to recreate Christianity in their own image, the ultimate progeny of which was a distinctively black interpretation of

the faith. Thus, I will first review the white church's denial of black humanity and the consequential splintered-self that oppressed blacks may have experienced, establishing the context for the texts of Douglass and King, and then proceed to explicate from these works the basic tenets of what will later be codified as modern Black liberation theology.

There can be no doubt that slavery and the oppression of Jim Crow segregation constituted a denial of black humanity. Oppression "robs men of their instinctive characteristics as rational and immortal beings and makes them things" (Stanton 59). This is betrayed by the very language of slavery as abolitionist Henry Brewster Stanton demonstrates, "slaves are deemed, bought, and sold . . ." (Stanton 59). Continuing his argument, he states that "Slavery un-creates the slave as a man, and recreates him as a chattel" (Stanton 59). King implies that this objectification persisted in his own time as he states that segregation changes the "I – thou" relationship to an "I – it" relationship (King, "Letter" 89).

The white church's distinct role in this dehumanization is equally as certain. In the 1800's, some churches, including many mainline Congregationalist, Anglican, and Presbyterian congregations, ignored the issue of slavery, with prominent theologians such as Jonathan Edwards preaching sermons devoid of so much as a casual aside on slavery. Even the Baptist and Methodist churches that supported abolition during the 18th century began to align their views with the economic interests of their members once the cotton industry reached its peak in the 19th century. Other ministers, such as Cotton Mather, adamantly defended slavery and advised white church members to instruct their slaves that God was the cause of their servitude and that in working for their Masters, they served Jesus Christ (Cone, *God of* 44). A few churches did support abolition but they comprised a small minority. Thus, the white church as a whole was guilty of dehumanization in that it failed to speak out against slavery. Moreover, both the southern and northern churches were also guilty of actively perpetuating the slave system, the southern church by the direct participation of its members as slave owners, and the northern church in its cooperation with the laws that propagated slavery such as the Fugitive Slave Law. The church used the virtues of obedience and subservience to justify their compliance with the Fugitive Slave Law, in effect instructing escaped slaves to "Go back, go back and wear your chains" (Foster 115). Indeed, the church's message as a whole in regards to slavery can be summed up in the sentiments expressed by a South Carolina preacher, Reverend J. Thornwell, who asserted that "The church will prove a stronger fortress against insubordination and rebellion than weapons of brass and iron" (qtd. in Gibson 4).

The white church in the civil rights era, generally followed the pattern of its predecessors, ignoring or upholding the Jim Crow laws. Many Southern church members actively participated in racially unjust practices, justifying their actions by claiming that the biblical curse of Ham constituted a basis for divine intent of black inferiority (Gibson 4). Northern churches, though supportive of black civil rights in principle, condemned acts of nonviolent resistance and civil disobedience, urging blacks to wait for a gradual legislative or social change. In the letter from white clergymen that prompted King's letter from jail, the ministers appeal to black communities to "observe the principles of law and order and common sense" and make their case in the courts and through negotiations with local leaders, not in the streets ("Statement by Alabama Clergymen").

After enduring six working days of being told they were nothing in a white man's world, blacks went to church to escape this degradation. Yet, a Christianity deriving its values from the white society that regarded blackness as "non-being" could offer little comfort, as this Blues verse indicates (qtd. in Cone, *God of 170*):

They say we are the Lawd's children
 I don't say that ain't true,
 They say we are the Lawd's children,
 I don't say that ain't true,
 But if we are the same like each other,
 Ooh, well, well, why do they treat me like they do

The purifying waters of Christianity served as both a bubbling fountain of redemptive hope and a cold, pale reflection of an innate inferiority, that like their black skin, could not be washed away. It was difficult for African-Americans to believe in the God of the white man, a struggle evident in Countee Cullen's famous poem "Yet Do I Marvel." Among all the injustices and strife in the world, Cullen suggests that the most incomprehensible is that God would "make a poet black and bid him sing" (451). Thus, out of the white church's sustained explicit and implicit degradation of black humanity and denial of the black struggle emerged the black experience of a splintered-self, described by W.E.B. Dubois as "two souls, two thoughts, two un-reconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder" (qtd. in Cone, *Black Theology in American* 1).

As a psychological necessity, African Americans sought a new understanding of reality, a new norm from which to define their worth, which was eventually conceived as a new interpretation of the Christian faith, eventually branded as Black liberation theology. Black theology strives to reconcile what it is to be Black and Christian, "a follower of

Jesus, in a world that portrays Jesus as a white man and Christianity as a European religion" (Cone and Wilmore 1). In response to this tension, black theologians assert that "God is black" (Cone, *A Black Theology of Liberation* 120). God identifies himself with the oppressed and His justice is therefore identical to the liberation of His people. God then, is not impartial in the black struggle but rather sits in active judgment against the actions of the oppressor.

Liberation is thus the central message of Scripture re-conceived from the perspective of black experience and culture. Identifying the gospel with the black struggle and casting Jesus as the Supreme Liberator, black theology affirms the worth of the black person, made in the image of God (Cone, *God of* 8). This affirmation of the black experience and of the intrinsic worth of the black people serves as the essence of black theology, invoking blacks to become co-workers with God in the struggle for liberation and thereby rejecting the otherworldly focus of much of mainline Christianity. Black theology denounces hypocritical white Christianity that paints an enticing picture of the hereafter while simultaneously tolerating and exacerbating injustice, and turns instead to the true church actively striving to end oppression in the here and now. These tenets of black theology—the affirmation of the black experience and black worth, God as siding with the oppressed against the oppressor, reinterpretation of scripture as inseparable from black history, the denunciation of the white church and its otherworldliness, and the call for black Christians to work alongside God for their liberation *now* rather than looking to the hereafter—are all expounded in the texts of Frederick Douglass and Martin Luther King Jr.

Douglass and King both imbue their texts with the duality of black Christianity described earlier. Addressing both the nation and the church, Douglass quotes Macbeth to illustrate this ("What To" 1748):

To palter with us in a double sense:

And keep the word of promise to the ear,

But break it to the heart. King too speaks of his people as the "victims of a broken promise" ("Letter" 86). He mentions that many in the black community, in their despair, have been "drained of a ... sense of somebodiness" in their adjustment to segregation, and that others, filled with bitterness, have rejected the white man's Christianity (93). King evokes an emotive sentiment in his audience as he describes explaining segregation to his six-year old daughter and seeing the "depressing clouds of inferiority begin to form in her little mental sky" (88).

The writers must therefore affirm black humanity, both to the white

society who would deny them an equal status, and for a black community who has lost sight of its own self-worth. Douglass's and King's affirmation of black humanity is significant in that their primary argument rejects external validation from white society, appealing instead to a divine or moral law to establish equality. This is most explicit in King, who defends civil disobedience and nonviolent protest as in accord with a divine law above any man-made law. He describes a just law as a law that aligns itself with the law of God, specifically any law that uplifts human personality, while an unjust law would be one that degrades or denies humanity. Thus, King validates the rights and, by extension, the humanity of the black people in reference to a divine law that sides with his people over and against the law of the land.

Douglass also implies this in his reluctance even to argue that a slave is a man, which he dismisses as a forgone conclusion. Although he subsequently appeals to the rationale of the law and even to sentiment, this is to appease an obtuse white society, which he is convinced will not be stirred by argument anyway, but rather by a conscience that realizes its crimes against God and man. Both texts are explicitly addressed to a white audience, yet subtle undercurrents affirming black value reveal that Douglass and King also use the texts to bolster the black community. In the same way, Black theology was initially viewed as an attack addressed to the white religious community, but it is, at its core, a strengthening of the black community and an advancement of black confidence.

In recognizing the humanity of the black people, Douglass and King also seek to affirm the black experience of struggle for liberation by identifying their struggle with Christian scripture. Black theology similarly interprets Scripture as the story of oppressed people, relying particularly on passages such as the Exodus story of God delivering His people from slavery to oppression, Isaiah and other prophets who announce God's concern for the oppressed, and Psalm 68:31, which says, "Princes shall come out of Egypt and Ethiopia shall soon stretch forth her hands unto God" (qtd. in Cone, *Black Theology in American* 759). Douglass, for instance, interprets Psalm 68:31 as a biblical allusion to the coming redemption of the African-American people. Douglass does not explicitly employ Exodus in this particular text, but he does parallel the black's situation of slavery with the captivity of the Israelites in Babylon, quoting from the Psalms their lament, "For there they carried us away captive, required of us a song; and they who wasted us required of us mirth . . . How can we sing the Lord's song in a strange land?" ("What To" 1738). If it is not thus far apparent to his audience who embodies the role of the oppressor in these references, Douglass does not hesitate to spell it out,

casting white Christians as scribes, Pharisees, and hypocrites, using James 1:27 ("What To" 1745).

King's texts, focused more on justifying the current action of his people, cites Old Testament figures and early Christians who refused to obey unjust laws to support his movement's civil disobedience (90, 97). Indeed, he cites Jesus himself as an extremist for love, reinterpreting the cross as a revolutionary act, a refusal to submit to this world. In this text he chooses not to use the Exodus story as a correlation, but the theme is prevalent in many of his other works. Cone notes the use of Exodus in King's prophetic last speech, "I've Seen the Mountaintop," in which he projects his people into the experience of the Israelites and depicts himself as Moses, whom God allows to see the promised land, although he may not get there with them (Cone, *God of 23*). In this way, King and Douglass recast Christian scripture as the story of their own people, conferring a divine validation to their experiences. Adopted by Black theologians as well, this vision transforms Scripture into a story of struggle and liberation that is told continually in the lives of oppressed people

The God depicted in this reinterpretation of scripture is not the God of the white man but a God who actively sides with the oppressed. King and Douglass both convey a detachment from the God of white people. King speaks of gazing at the imposing church buildings of the white people and wondering who this God is that they worship, a God that whites believe instructs them to remain silent in response to hatred, or to stand with idle hands rather than extending a hand to help their black brothers and sisters rise to freedom (96). King and the supporters of the civil rights movement believe that "the eternal will of God [is] embodied in our echoing demand" (98). Douglass repeatedly separates his God from the white God by referring to "your God" when addressing his white audience. He even asserts that white men worships the God of money, mentioning more than once that the church and its ministers are motivated by "mint, anise, and cumin" rather than justice and he makes a furtive reference to Mammon ("What To" 1744, 1736). Douglass says that in denouncing slavery he stands with both God and the "crushed and bleeding slave," clearly asserting that his God is on the side of the oppressed ("What To" 1739).

Not only does God empathize with the oppressed; His judgment is on the oppressor and, in this case, on the church that has sided with the oppressors. Douglass substantiates the alliance between the church and the oppressor as he decries church support for the Fugitive Slave Law. Such a church, he says, makes religion into an "empty ceremony, and not a vital principle," and labels its members as "oppressors, tyrants,

man-stealers and thugs" and its theologians as "champions of oppressors" (Douglass, "What To" 1744, 1746). King, though more positive towards the church, reiterates these sentiments as he claims that the church has "blemished and scarred" the body of Christ with its apathy and resistance to change (97). With this validation, the authors precede to declare God's judgment on the church. King explicitly states this judgment, going on to say that if the church does not renew itself as the powerful defender of justice that the early Christians epitomized, it will become an irrelevant social institution (97). Douglass is, as usual, more severe in his judgment; quoting Isaiah 1:13-17 he warns the church, "YOUR HANDS ARE FULL OF BLOOD . . ." and urges them to repent ("What To" 1745).

Despite this strident judgment, it is clear that siding with the oppressed does not make God unduly partial, but rather that freeing the oppressed will ultimately benefit the tyrant as well. King notes the unavoidable mutuality that means that what one does affects the other; thus liberating the oppressed also liberates the oppressor from the self-induced poisoning of his soul (88). King and Douglass make ironic use of the symbols of slavery in remarking that oppression of the black people *fetters* or *chains* the nation's progress and poses an imminent threat to the vitality of the nation as a whole (Douglass 1748; King 97). They are adamant, though, in warning their white audience about the consequences of continued denial of black frustrations. Douglass speaks of slavery as "breeding insolence" and is confident in the inevitable downfall of slavery in his belief that "The arm of the Lord is not shortened" (1748, 1749). King echoes this inevitability and urgency as he states that "Oppressed people cannot remain oppressed forever" (93). He metaphorically alludes to black tensions using water imagery, emphasizing that if whites continue to reject nonviolent efforts to *channel* the frustration and despair of the black people, these pent-up emotions, subtly compared to a swiftly flowing river, may *engulf* the black community. Unjust laws serve as perilous dams and without nonviolent channels, King says, "many streets of the South would be flowing with floods of blood" (91, 93-94).

In this way, King and Douglass refute the pleas of the white community to negotiate or to continue to wait for the passing of time to end their sufferings. They agree that freedom is never willingly granted by the oppressor, but rather must be actively seized by the oppressed. The God of the oppressed black community, calls them to be active co-workers for their own liberation (King 92). This is a dissent from white religion's emphasis on the otherworldly, which placated black cries for justice with pious promises of heavenly freedom and rewards for

obedience. King specifically criticizes this otherworldly focus of white religion that distinguishes between body and soul, sacred and secular, lamenting that white churches refused to relate the black struggle to the gospel, dismissing their experience as a social issue irrelevant to Christianity (96). According to Donald Gibson, this rejection of the otherworldly is a return to the roots of African religion, a religion which infused all of society, observing no boundaries of sacred and secular (3). King and Douglass renew this notion of an active faith involved in the worldly affairs of the people, a belief that later became an essential part of Black Theology which emphasized the role of the oppressed people themselves to be active workers in bringing about their own liberation and in ushering in the kingdom of God.

After shedding their loyalty to the church and initiating an active role as co-workers of God, the black people began to claim the validity of their own theology and church. King and Douglass show the dawn of this cultural ownership as they distinguish between the white church and what King dubs as the "true church." For Douglass, the church has failed him in such a way that he would welcome atheism rather than accept such a hypocritical, false religion ("What To" 1745). This strand of thinking anticipates Malcolm X and the Black Power movement whose angry influence led black theologians such as James Cone to, at one time, regard the white church as irredeemably corrupt, with Black theology as the only true Christianity (Cone, *A Black Theology of Liberation* 14).

Martin Luther King, Jr., though more conciliatory in distinguishing the true church from the actions of the white church of his time, identifies the true church with the inner spiritual church, which is acting against the majority of churches in defending the oppressed. Although he implies that it is the black church and a few brave white people who are currently embodying this true church, his definition is more forgiving and leaves room for the white church to repent and join the true church. This conception of the true church has been the most enduring in modern Black theology which says that white Christians may be redeemed by "becoming black," identifying with the black experience of oppression and aggressively working to end oppression (Cone, *A Black Theology of Liberation* 46). Black theology has thus reversed the religious status quo by requiring white society to conform to a standard set by the black community in order to be a true interpretation of Christianity.

In conclusion, both Douglass and King present an affirmation of black humanity based on divine law and a reinterpretation of Scripture that finds God consistently in alliance with the oppressed, thus moving black religion away from the external validation of white society to an internal validation. With the security of this affirmation, they proceed to

denounce the Christianity of the white church and develop an independent understanding of God as the Liberator of the Oppressed, which would later be formally articulated as Black Liberation Theology. In gaining a culturally autonomous understanding of religion based on their own experiences, Black Christians held onto a sense of self-value in a world that sought to shatter their self-image. This ownership of their religion and consequent internal validation of their self-worth moved them from a desperate anticipation of the hereafter to active redemption for themselves as co-workers with God. Donald Gibson underscores this in saying, "Religion, Christianity, and God have meaning only insofar as the concepts are concretized in the acts of people, and in the acts of people their reality is rendered" (10). The seeds of ownership and black affirmation sown by Douglass and King in their respective times of struggle became the roots of a modern Black theology that begins to reconcile the duality of being black and Christian in America. In this way, the texts of Douglass and King demonstrate the triumph of black Christians in preserving the transcendent hope that oppression could not repress and in salvaging the soul of a black people that white oppressors could never fully own.

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Lincoln's Purposeful Faith During the Civil War

Daniel Tidwell

When Lincoln left his hometown of Springfield for Washington in February of 1861, a presidency filled with extreme adversity awaited him. Over time, the conflict between the North and the South escalated to a level in which fighting seemed inevitable and his election almost guaranteed all-out war. Lincoln confronted this challenge with a deep reliance on his unorthodox faith. The Calvinism of his earlier years, combined with the skepticism of his Enlightenment views, to form a belief in a powerful yet distant Supreme Being. Nevertheless, the adversity Lincoln experienced during the course of the war transformed not only his religious beliefs, but also the degree of his dependence on God. The combination of his son Willie's death and the extensive burden of the Presidency during the Civil War propelled Lincoln to embrace and trust in a more purposeful deity. Lincoln's dependence upon the sovereignty of God helped to alleviate the mental anguish of the war as he concluded that the fight belonged to God and not him. Furthermore, when Lincoln reverted to his Calvinist roots, he found the strength and the confidence to accept the increase of Northern casualties and boldly make the crucial decisions without fear of the consequences. In short, Lincoln trusted God. His primary mental struggle centered on the discovery of God's purpose for the war and his specific role in its accomplishment. Lincoln's letters and writings serve to reveal the evolution of his religious transformation and the deep struggles he experienced throughout the conflict.

Most historians agree that Lincoln's faith underwent somewhat of a transformation between 1860 and 1865. The debate of the nature and degree of this change began soon after his assassination at Ford's Theatre on April 14, 1865, and continues to this day. Many historians, such as David Donald, argue that Lincoln did not experience a specific conversion, but rather that the presidency deepened and solidified a previously established faith.¹ Other historians disagree and argue that the language in Lincoln's letters and speeches does not change dramatically during his presidency and that his principle beliefs

¹ Though many people claim that such a conversion occurred, particularly at Gettysburg, no concrete evidence exists supporting it. David Donald. *Lincoln*. (New York: A Touchstone Book, 1995, 337).

remained the same.² Despite the differing perspectives on whether or not Lincoln's religious perspectives changed during the war, all agree on the supreme importance of his speeches and personal letters to discover and understand those beliefs and convictions that he held.³

Much of the historical evidence from Lincoln's life suggests that he became a skeptic in his early years and departed from his Calvinist upbringing. Undoubtedly, life on the frontier exposed him to a variety of fiery evangelists and emotional displays. Donald argues that the apparent chaotic emotionalism on the frontier drove Lincoln away from organized religion.⁴ As he grew older the influence of Thomas Paine, Voltaire, and other Enlightenment thinkers played a large role in the development of his religious beliefs. According to his law partner, William H. Herndon, Lincoln in New Salem associated with skeptics and infidels who hung tightly to the liberal European philosophy of the eighteenth century.⁵ He later suggested that Lincoln held the beliefs of an agnostic throughout his entire life and never lost his skepticism. Nevertheless, Herndon's relationship with Lincoln became more distant when Lincoln entered politics and his writings contain opinions based primarily on hearsay.⁶ However, most historians agree that Lincoln's skepticism and doubt of a personal God reached its peak when Lincoln worked at Offcutt's Store as a young man in New Salem.⁷

Although Lincoln's religious views certainly evolved from his years in New Salem, the explanation of his faith in the *Illinois Gazette* on August 11, 1846 demonstrates his prior belief in a distant and aloof deity. Peter Cartwright, a Methodist circuit riding preacher and the Democratic opponent in the Congressional race, spoke often of Lincoln's unorthodox beliefs during the campaign. In a letter to the editor released in the paper to the public Lincoln used evasive language to persuade his constituency of his friendliness towards the Christian religion, and he also acknowledged his lack of membership in a particular church. As for his doctrine Lincoln writes, "It is true that in early life I was inclined to believe in what I called the 'Doctrine of Necessity'—that is, that the human mind is impelled to action, or held in rest by some power, over

² Allen C. Guelzo, *Abraham Lincoln: Redcemer President*. (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1999), 443.

³ Elton Trueblood, *Abraham Lincoln: Theologian of American Anguish*. (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1953), 3.

⁴ Donald, *Lincoln*, 15.

⁵ Edmund Wilson, "The Union as Religious Mysticism," *Eight Essays* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1954), 192.

⁶ Richard N. Current, *The Lincoln Nobody Knows* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1958), 58.

⁷ Donald, *Lincoln*, 49.

which the mind itself has no control."⁸ In other words, people do not possess the free will or the full moral responsibility for their actions.⁹ According to this view, a machine-like deity or spiritual law controls the destiny of every individual and indeed all of history.

Although much of the evidence suggests that Lincoln still believed in the "Doctrine of Necessity" upon his election in 1860, his Farewell Address given in Springfield on February 11, 1861, suggests a deeper dependence upon God. In an emotional speech Lincoln said, "Without the assistance of that Divine Being who ever attended him, I cannot succeed. With that assistance, I cannot fail."¹⁰ Though Lincoln used the impersonal phrase "Divine Being" in his speech, he believed early on that his presidency, along with the success of the Union, depended not on his autonomous choices as president but rather on a purposeful deity, which preordained all events. Perhaps, the enormity of the task ahead encouraged Lincoln to revert back to certain elements of the Calvinist ideology of his childhood. The ideas spoken by Lincoln at Springfield lead many historians to believe that Lincoln embraced the idea of fatalism.¹¹ However, it is important to note that Lincoln used the word "help" in his speech, which suggests that he believed he held an important role.

While Lincoln's Farewell Address provides some important insights into his evolving faith, his Proclamation of a National Fast Day on August 12, 1861 demonstrates a departure from his earlier days of skepticism. Lincoln implores the nation to "pray for His mercy—to pray that we may be spared further punishment, though most justly deserved."¹² Lincoln embraces the idea of a more purposeful God in this speech and moves away from the machine-like God of natural order he accepted while practicing law with William H. Herndon. Furthermore, Lincoln makes a clean break with his previous beliefs in the superiority of human reason in leadership and instead suggests that the nation's blessings occurred because of neither Democratic principle nor the wisdom of the founding fathers, but rather divine guidance.¹³ As the pressures of the war intensified and the amount of bloodshed increased on both sides,

⁸ See the Letter to the Editor of the Illinois Gazette, August 11, 1846. Roy P. Basler, *Abraham Lincoln: His Speeches and Writings* (Cleveland: World Pub. Co., 1946), 187-188.

⁹ Guelzo, *Abraham Lincoln: Redeemer President*, 117.

¹⁰ See Lincoln's Farewell Address at Springfield, Illinois, February 11, 1861. Basler, *Abraham Lincoln: His Speeches and Writings*, 568.

¹¹ Lincoln's idea of fatalism probably contributed to his premonitions in the White House of his own death. Wayne C. Temple, *Abraham Lincoln: From Skeptic to Prophet* (Mahomet, Illinois: Mayhaven Publishing, 1995), 88.

¹² See Lincoln's first Proclamation of a National Fast-Day, August 12, 1861. Basler, *Abraham Lincoln: His Speeches and Writings*, 610.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 610.

Lincoln's religious beliefs put less emphasis on human reason and more emphasis on God.¹⁴ From the beginning of the conflict, the Calvinist conception of God allowed Lincoln to lighten the heavy load of responsibility upon his presidency.

Although Lincoln's religious beliefs underwent somewhat of a transformation during his first year as president, the death of his son Willie on February 20, 1862 moved Lincoln farther along in his acceptance of a purposeful yet benevolent God. One historian argues that this event served to only solidify Lincoln's previously held belief in the "Doctrine of Necessity."¹⁵ He accepted the death of his beloved son as a part of God's purpose for his life. However, Lincoln certainly questioned his beliefs during this period as evident by the times he spoke with the Reverend Phineas D. Gurley in search of solace. He regularly attended the services at the New York Avenue Presbyterian Church during much of his presidency and became a close friend of Reverend Gurley.¹⁶ Unfortunately, Lincoln fails to mention in his writings the extent of his religious transformation during this difficult period, and the testimony of Gurley fails to speak of a dramatic conversion. The lack of religious bias in his testimony regarding Lincoln gives credence to his knowledge of Lincoln's faith. Though much of his theology probably remained unchanged when Willie died, his belief in an after life deepened. Many witnesses including Gurley emphatically state that Lincoln believed that Willie joined his brother Eddie in Heaven.¹⁷ Some historians argue that his evolving view of a purposeful and benevolent God kept him from a belief in everlasting punishment and moved him more toward Universalism.¹⁸ Despite the substantial amount of evidence for this viewpoint from witnesses and close friends, Lincoln never publicly stated this opinion, but rather chose to keep his specific theological viewpoints private. Nevertheless, the loss of his young son Willie solidified this belief and caused Lincoln to seek help outside of his own intellect and rationale to find comfort for his devastating loss.¹⁹ The humility and brokenness Lincoln experienced with the loss of his son in the terrible winter of 1862 initiated a transformation in Lincoln's faith and contributed to his continual search to discover the will of God. Perhaps the turmoil he experienced through the loss of his son altered the decisions made thereafter.

¹⁴ Nicholas Parrillo. "Lincoln's Calvinist Transformation: Emancipation and War," *Civil War History*, Sept. 2000, 2.

¹⁵ Donald, *Lincoln*, 337.

¹⁶ William E. Barton. *The Soul of Abraham Lincoln* (New York: George H. Doran, 1920), 87.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 96.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 96. Wolf, *The Almost Chosen People*, 104.

¹⁹ Wolf, *The Almost Chosen People*, 122.

While Willie's death compelled the president to both question and deepen his religious views, the early struggles of the war also convinced Lincoln of a more purposeful deity who worked outside of a machine-like natural order to achieve His own will. By September of 1862, the Union failed to possess a clear advantage over the Confederacy, and Lincoln questioned the nature of God's plan in his "Meditation on the Divine Will." The troubled president writes, "It is quite possible that God's purpose is something different from the purpose of either party; and yet the human instrumentalities, working just as they do, are of the best adaptation to affect his purpose."²⁰ This belief system removed the primary responsibility for the war from himself, along with everyone else including the Southern planter class, and instead placed it on a purposeful and sovereign God. Nevertheless, during a year of personal loss and public difficulty, Lincoln's faith in an omnipotent interventionist God lessened the ever-increasing pressure of the wartime presidency. Lincoln's "Meditation of 1862" demonstrates a dramatic shift in his beliefs from the skepticism exhibited in Illinois to an assurance of a just and preordained purpose of God.²¹

As the war continued and the pressure and stress increased, Lincoln's trust in a purposeful deity grew stronger. In the majority of his letters before the presidential election, Lincoln rarely referred to God or expressed theological beliefs.²² For example, in a letter written before the war to George Latham concerning his failed attempt to enter Harvard, Lincoln writes, "It is a certain truth, that you can enter, and graduate in, Harvard University."²³ He makes no reference to the unknown divine purposes, which he later makes throughout his presidency. However, with the daily pressure of critical decision-making, Lincoln's humility and trust in God expanded. For example, in a reply letter written to James C. Conkling on August 26, 1863, Lincoln writes, "Let us not be over-sanguine of a speedy final triumph. Let us be quite sober. Let us diligently apply the means, never doubting that a just God, in his own good time, will give us the rightful result."²⁴ Lincoln explicitly warns Conkling of over confidence and a self-reliant attitude without the acknowledgment of a Supreme Being. The humility and quiet faith of

²⁰ See Lincoln's "Meditation on the Divine Will," Basler, *Abraham Lincoln: His Speeches and Writings*, 655.

²¹ Trueblood, *Lincoln: Theologian of American Anguish*, 8.

²² Donald, *Lincoln*, 337.

²³ See Lincoln's letter to George Latham. July 22, 1860. Basler, *Abraham Lincoln: His Speeches and Writings*, 559.

²⁴ See Lincoln's letter to James C. Conkling. August 26, 1863. Basler, *Abraham Lincoln: His Speeches and Writings*, 724.

the Lincoln presidency allowed the Union to endure the frustrating early years of the war.

Although Lincoln's faith in God evolved throughout his presidency, another crucial element of this religious transformation depended upon the faith of common people such as a Quaker widow named Eliza P. Gurley. Several times during the war, Gurley met and prayed with the president. While the nature of these conversations remains a mystery, the President wrote a few letters to her, which reveals his religious fervor. In a letter written on September 4, 1864 Lincoln writes, "I am much indebted to the good Christian people of the country for their constant prayers and consolations; and to no one of them, more than to yourself."²⁵ If Lincoln's agnostic beliefs remained constant and political motivations directed his political rhetoric, Lincoln had little time to waste with unassuming, dainty widows, such as Ms. Gurley. In addition to this, as a member of the Society of Friends, she likely sought to convert Lincoln to her Pacifist beliefs. Thus, it is clear that Lincoln relied on her not because of interesting intellectual discussions, but rather, as a source of strength to his beliefs in a purposeful and benevolent God.

Lincoln's reliance on people of faith during the war contributed to a view of God, which focused on the goodness of God toward man. His Proclamation for Thanksgiving given on October 3, 1863 gives thanks to a God concerned with not only the nation's destiny, but also the individual welfare of every citizen and soldier. Lincoln points out the nation's abundance and writes, "No human counsel hath devised nor hath any mortal hand worked out these great things. They are the gracious gifts of the Most High God, who, while dealing with us in anger for our sins, hath nevertheless remembered mercy."²⁶ In this proclamation, Lincoln apparently refers to Habakkuk 3:2 in which the prophet Habakkuk cries out, "O Lord, revive Your work in the midst of the years! In the midst of the years make it known; In wrath remember mercy." Lincoln makes a direct comparison between the biblical notion of God's intervention in the nation of Israel and his view of God's blessing and judgment on America. Lincoln considered the Union a work of God that needed revival through both mercy and judgment. Far from the idea of a Supreme Being, which serves as a sort of universal law, Lincoln believed in an active deity, who cared deeply about His purpose for the United States. Just as Habakkuk the prophet cried out for the preservation of Judah in Biblical times, Lincoln thanks an active and purposeful God in advance for the preservation of the Union.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 757.

²⁶ See Lincoln's Proclamation for Thanksgiving, October 3, 1863. Basler, *Abraham Lincoln: His Speeches and Writings*, 728.

Based on his use of the obscure prophet Habakkuk in his Proclamation of Thanksgiving, Lincoln knew the scriptures well. As the war went on, Lincoln spent more time reading the Bible, especially Psalms and the Old Testament.²⁷ A thorough study of the scriptures contributed to Lincoln's abandonment of much of the skeptical views he acquired in his study of Enlightenment philosophy. The peace that Lincoln found in scripture gradually moved him away from his earlier doubts.²⁸ According to many witnesses and friends, Lincoln also spent a great deal of time in personal prayer during the war in order to find strength and rest.²⁹ Although Lincoln fails to mention his practice of personal prayer in any of his official writings, the religious fervor contained in many of his speeches and proclamations certainly suggests it.³⁰ Lincoln's practice of these spiritual disciplines contributed to his optimistic attitude he held throughout much of the war.

While Lincoln's personal prayer and use of scripture certainly demonstrate a deepening faith in God, his refusal to join a particular religious denomination persuades some historians that Lincoln's faith never changed. After his death, many different Christian denominations and sects erroneously claimed Lincoln as a committed member or future member of their particular denomination.³¹ Moreover, Lincoln wished to remain free from the dogma and liturgy of one particular denomination, and he wisely kept many of his specific doctrinal opinions to himself.³² In addition to this, the vast majority of the population of the United States in 1860 belonged to no specific church or denomination.³³ During this period, actual church attendance remained more important than membership. Possibly, because of his frontier roots, Lincoln relied upon his own interpretation of scripture instead of a specific creed as a foundation for his faith.³⁴ Nevertheless, some historians argue that Lincoln's pragmatism and obsession with the preservation of the Union led to his many appearances in church and the many Biblical references

²⁷ Many witnesses testify to his constant reading of the scriptures. The Old Testament probably appealed to Lincoln because of the many prophecies and dreams. Donald, *Lincoln*, 514.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 514.

²⁹ Wolf, *The Almost Chosen People*, 125.

³⁰ An enormous amount of evidence suggests that Lincoln spent time in prayer on a regular basis Trueblood, *Lincoln: Theologian of American Anguish*, 73.

³¹ The Methodists, Baptists, Spiritualists, Unitarians, Agnostics, and many others claimed Lincoln. Wolf, *The Almost Chosen People*, 26.

³² Lincoln's refusal to join a specific church compelled Mary to say that Lincoln "'was not a technical Christian.'" Donald, *Lincoln*, 514.

³³ 77 percent of the population in 1860 refused to join a church, although many attended regularly. Trueblood, *Theologian of American Anguish*, 96.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 55.

in his speeches and writings.³⁵ Unfortunately, this argument calls into question Lincoln's honesty, a fundamental quality of his character. Insincere or politically driven use of religion fails to fit into the pattern of the excellent character that Lincoln possessed. Certainly, his primary goal remained the preservation of the Union, but not at the expense of his faith and convictions. This argument also fails to explain the increase of religious fervor in his proclamations and speeches as president, and the private conversations with clergy and friends. In his National Fast Day on April 30, 1863, Lincoln writes, "'It is the duty of nations as well as men, to own their dependence upon the overruling power of God.'" ³⁶ A deep reliance on God remains the only reasonable explanation for Lincoln's consistent appearances in church and his constant use of scripture in his writings.

Although Lincoln's confidence in God increased throughout his presidency, he often struggled to discern the purpose of God in the war and his role in it. From the beginning of the war in 1861, Lincoln earnestly sought to understand the reason for the seemingly endless list of men killed or wounded in the war.³⁷ As a response to this anguish and the pressures of the job, Lincoln relied on God to make important strategic decisions.³⁸ He never claimed to understand God's complete purpose in the war, but his belief in a more willful deity certainly influenced his suspicion of God's judgment on the institution of slavery. Lincoln believed that God revealed His will over an extended process of time, which explains his gradual movement toward emancipation.³⁹ As he dealt with Emancipation policy, he gradually saw a redemptive element in the bloodshed for the black slave.⁴⁰ By the end of the war, Lincoln not only believed that the war served to preserve the Union, but also to free God's oppressed children. His personal view of God evolved to include a more specific version of divine justice. Before the war began, Lincoln believed in an eventual end to slavery sometime far into the future.⁴¹ Nevertheless, as early as 1862, after the Union army defeated the Rebels at Antietam, Lincoln believed that God allowed for victory as a sign for

³⁵ Lincoln's used the Bible and Shakespeare in his speeches to "amuse both secular and evangelical Whigs." Guelzo, *Lincoln: Redeemer President*, 318.

³⁶ See Lincoln's Proclamation of a National Fast Day taken from Wolf, *The Almost Chosen People*, 162-163.

³⁷ Wolf, *The Almost Chosen People*, 146-147.

³⁸ Temple, *Abraham Lincoln: From Skeptic to Prophet*, 216.

³⁹ Parillo, *Lincoln's Calvinist Transformation: Emancipation and War*, 2.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 5.

Emancipation.⁴² After each subsequent Northern victory, Lincoln's understanding of the divine will for the Civil War became even clearer to him.

Regardless of Lincoln's interpretation of the significance of the war, his Calvinistic beliefs in God's plan for America became entrenched with time. According to his later writings, God intended the war to purge the nation of the sin of slavery.⁴³ He eventually concluded that he served an important role in the execution of this plan as president. Lincoln's belief in his own association with the will of God grew stronger as the war continued.⁴⁴ By the end of the war, Lincoln's language appears almost prophetic. Nevertheless, no credible evidence exists that suggests that Lincoln's newfound faith in a personal God led him to depend on divine revelations for guidance during the war.⁴⁵ Instead, Lincoln relied on his pragmatism with the assurance of the completion of God's plan in due time. Lincoln attributed each military success and failure in the war not as brilliance or stupidity on his part, but rather part of a purposeful God's specific plan for the reunification of the nation.

While Lincoln increasingly depended upon the sovereignty of God in victories and defeats, his Second Inaugural Address demonstrates the completion of his faith in a more purposeful God. The speech contains an abundance of theology, which combines his Calvinistic belief in a judgmental but benevolent God with unknowable purposes.⁴⁶ Nevertheless, Lincoln believed that God intended the war to purge the nation of the sin of slavery. He argues, "If we shall suppose that American Slavery is one of those offences which, in the providence of God, must needs come, but which, having continued through His appointed time, He now wills to remove . . . shall we discern therein any departure from those divine attributes which the believers in a living God always ascribe to Him?"⁴⁷ These characteristics in which Lincoln refers demonstrate his belief in an active God with His own distinct purposes.

⁴² Ibid., 9.

⁴³ Hein, "Abraham Lincoln's Theological Outlook," *Essays on Lincoln's Faith and Politics, Volume IV*, 109.

⁴⁴ Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Mind of Abraham Lincoln: A Study In Detachment," *Essays On Lincoln's Faith and Politics, Volume IV*. Ed. Kenneth W. Thompson. (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, Inc., 1983), 13.

⁴⁵ Some historians argue that Lincoln believed in signs, visions, and omens, but none of his writings include any concrete evidence for this. David Hein, "Abraham Lincoln's Theological Outlook," *Essays on Lincoln's Faith and Politics, Volume IV*. Ed. Kenneth W. Thompson (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, Inc., 1983), 171.

⁴⁶ After Lincoln gave his speech, he kissed the Bible. Donald, *Lincoln*, 568.

⁴⁷ See Lincoln's Second Inaugural Address. March 4, 1865. Basler, *Abraham Lincoln: His Speeches and Writings*, 792-793.

For this reason, he refuses to judge the South in the speech.⁴⁸ According to Lincoln and his redefined version of the "Doctrine of Necessity," neither the Union nor the Confederacy bore the responsibility for the conflict, but instead acted under the compulsion of divine will. In a letter to Thuroow Weed dated almost two weeks later, Lincoln defends his Calvinistic statements in the speech and then says, "It is a truth which I thought needed to be told; and as whatever of humiliation there is in it, falls most directly on myself, I thought others might afford for me to tell it."⁴⁹ Once again, Lincoln speaks as a prophet compelled to share God's message of judgment and forgiveness. Just as many prophets suffered humiliation and death in the Old Testament, Lincoln probably viewed his destiny in much of the same light.

Although the evolution of Lincoln's religious beliefs occurred throughout his entire lifetime, the turmoil of the Civil War transformed his faith in a significant way. Whether or not Lincoln experienced a specific conversion during a particular time in the war remains a mystery, but Lincoln clearly expresses his trust in a purposeful God throughout his writings.⁵⁰ The loss of his beloved son Willie and the daily stresses of the Civil War caused Lincoln to look outside of human reason for answers. Lincoln concluded that God preordained his presidency to fulfill the divine purpose of the preservation of the Union and the emancipation of slaves. He believed God's sovereign purpose directs the events of history. According to him, the judgment of the Civil War came about because of the national sin of slavery. Lincoln's notion of a personal God with a specific plan for America allowed him to reach out to the South and promote reconciliation soon after the war. With his earlier days of skepticism behind him, President Lincoln served in an almost prophetic role during a vulnerable time in the nation's history.

⁴⁸ Many Northern preachers preached a much harsher message than Lincoln and emphasized God's retribution on the South. See Mark A. Noll "'Both Pray to the Same God': The Singularity of Lincoln's Faith in the Era of the Civil War," *Journal of the Abraham Lincoln Association*, Winter 1997, 5.

⁴⁹ See Lincoln's letter to Thurlow Weed. Basler, *Abraham Lincoln: His Speeches and Writings*, 794.

⁵⁰ During his presidency, Lincoln reached "depths of spirituality never touched by Washington". Merrill D. Peterson. *Lincoln in American Memory* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 218.

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Degrees of Suffering and Moral Perfection

Joseph John

Robert Merrihew Adams has sought to defend a traditional notion of God. This traditional notion of God includes that God is both omnipotent and omni-benevolent. For the sake of argument, God is considered capable of creating the best of all possible worlds. Adams accepts that God has not done this: suffering is a fact, and each creature could theoretically be happier than it is. Therefore, God has created a world less perfect than he is capable of. Many philosophers have argued that if God has created a world that is not the best of all possible worlds, he cannot be perfectly good. Adams tries to discredit this claim. Adams contends that God, by creating a world that is less than perfect, has not truly wronged any of the creatures in it. God can be perfectly good and create creatures that suffer more than others he could have created.

Adams uses the following example to demonstrate his point: a couple has a strong desire to have a retarded child. In order to do this, they intentionally take a drug to cause mental and physical retardation in the child. The parents are wealthy and loving enough to care for the child and all of its needs. The child is happy, overall, though it may be severely disabled and unable to function as a normal human being. Most people would say that the child has been wronged; it seems intuitive. However, Adams argues that upon further inspection, the child has not truly been wronged. Although the parents have done something wrong, they have not wronged the child by creating it. He says that they were wrong in that the retarded child would then be less able to fill God's purpose.

In this paper, I will argue that Adam's argument is significantly flawed. The teleological ethic he appeals to in order to condemn the parents' actions is not sufficiently argued. The main problem, though, is that Adam's case rests on some major metaphysical assumptions. I will contend that by making a being that is not as happy as it could be, the parents in this example are in fact morally wrong. There can be no distinction between doing something wrong and wronging the child.

Before I proceed, I would like to note that the intelligence of a being only matters insofar as it concerns its suffering. I will disregard moral judgments concerning kinds of pleasure and suffering, and focus on the claim that an omni-benevolent God can create unnecessary suffering. I do not have the means to calculate how much and what kind of suffering a being endures from not being able to read. Perhaps it is better for God

to make a happy idiot than a sad genius (as some philosophers have argued) but I will not venture a guess at this. No matter whether or not an intelligent being suffers more than a stupid one, I will try to take all kinds of suffering into account. I will assume that the life of the retarded child is not as happy and fulfilling as the parents could have allowed it to be, at least compared to the normal child it would have been. This seems to be Adam's intention.

Adams maintains that a creator is not wrong in creating a being as long as two conditions are met:

(4) The creature is not, on the whole, so miserable that it would be better for him if he had never existed.

(5) No being who came into existence in better or happier circumstances would have been the same individual as the creature in question. (101)

Adams notes that conditions (4) and (5) are necessary, but not individually sufficient to maintain God's benevolence. I think it is doubtful that every creature that has ever existed has had a sufficiently happy life so as to fulfill condition (4). For now, though, I will grant it. Condition (5), though, has metaphysical implications. It takes for granted that any change to a creature's life would render it a different creature.

In the case of the child, Adams writes that by altering the genetic constitution of the child, it is in fact a different child from the normal one that would have been born otherwise. I will borrow some language here from Alvin Plantinga, another philosopher of religion. If the parents have altered the genetic constitution of the child, they have created a retarded child in this world, *Kronos* (the world in which we live). Therefore, the hypothetical child that they could have created would be in world *W* (a theoretical world that could have existed, but did not). Since world *W* does not exist, there is no real child there to be wronged; God does not have a responsibility to create every possible being. Adams argues that

If the child is not worse off than if it had never existed, and if *its* never existing would have been a sure consequence of its not having been brought into existence as retarded, I do not see how *its* interests could have been injured, or *its* rights violated, by the parent's bringing it into existence as retarded. (101)

What kind of complaint would the creature be able to make? Adams argues that a creature could make the claim that God should have created him under better circumstances, even though it would mean that other creatures would have had to suffer. First of all, Adams assumes a zero-sum game, that there is a finite amount of happiness to be

distributed. This overlooks the premise that God is omnipotent; God should, in theory, be able to create a world in which all creatures are as happy as possible. Adams' response is that "Such a complaint would not be reasonable, and would not establish that there had been any violation of the complaining creature's rights" (95). He misses the point, I think, in that we are not talking explicitly about rights. We are talking about how an omni-benevolent being could come to cause unnecessary suffering (95). He also argues that if God were to grant the creature's wish, the complaining creature would not exist in the best of all possible worlds, and subsequently would not be able to complain. But this is also missing the point; if the complaining creature had not existed, there would be no *reason* to complain either; God would have done his job. The fact that there was a reason to complain is the basis for the complaint, not the existence of the creature. As it is only a being in world *W*, God could not have wronged it.

Before we proceed, it is necessary to define what "creating" a being entails. From God's point of view (the one in which he calculates the success of condition (4)), "creating" must entail bringing about the entirety of the circumstances under which a being will exist. In other words, all of our circumstances create who we are. When parents choose to dress their child in blue or white, they have changed the world it lives in (though not in a moral sense). Adams does not disagree with this. He writes that we cannot ask questions like, "What if I had been born in the Middle Ages" (102), because we would not have been the same person if we had lived in the Middle Ages. When, then, is a being created? Our genetic makeup does not set our future in stone, but it affects what we look like. The manners we are raised with affect how we act later in life. For God, the creation of a creature means more than its birth; it must mean the entirety of its life. Therefore, every change in the world continually redefines a creature in each passing moment, thus changing what its creation entails. A being is a stream of existence, not an unchanging existence that plows its way through a separate reality.

Adams assumes that God, in creating a being's existence, is not capable of altering the being without changing it into another one. Adams holds that "No being who came into existence in better or happier circumstances would have been the same individual as the creature in question" (101). I believe that this is true. If, in world *W*, God were to fly down from His palace on the moon and give me 10 dollars, I would be a different person than I am in the reality of *Kronos*. If God created the world so that a certain creature would have been happier, would it truly be a different creature? Adams argues that it is. And since God has no

obligation in world *W*, he does not wrong me by not giving me money. Thus Adams argues that the child is not wronged, as the normal child exists only in *W*.

However, it must also be the case that "No being who came into existence in worse or more miserable circumstances would have been the same individual as the creature in question." If God were to come hit me in the face (in *Kronos*), thus making my existence less pleasurable, would I be a different creature that I was previously? I believe I would be a different creature. Therefore, God was not wrong in hitting me in the face, because he had no obligation to the potential version of me in *W* that did not get hit in the face. God could beat me up as much as he wanted to, just so long as he let me remain just barely happy enough to satisfy condition (4). Therefore, when God creates a different child by causing him unnecessary suffering, Adams maintains that He can remain benevolent.

Of course, Adams argues that if the normal child is a mere potentiality, God does nothing wrong. Before the child's existence begins, he has no obligation to it. However, we are not talking about whether or not he should create a being. He has already decided to do this; the issue is which of the two beings to create. After he decides to create a being (that being's entire life), the issue becomes, "what set of attributes should I give to the being that I am creating?" Because God causes the child's existence, it must be within God's power to remove the child's suffering without fundamentally removing it from existence. God does not have an obligation to create the hypothetical normal child; however, God could, if omnipotent, make changes to the retarded child so it could enjoy a life at least as enjoyable as the normal child. If he did so, would this mean that the retarded child no longer exists? Yes. It already is constantly undergoing changes to its being that, if Adams logic is what I interpret it to be, are already constantly recreating what the child is. However, does this mean that the child has been wronged, cut out of existence unfairly? No. Thus, what the being is cannot be derived specifically from any limited set of circumstances. Even though God would make a "different" being by wronging it, the being is continually being made different with its changing circumstances.

If principle (4) is adequate, we must acknowledge that the parents could do no wrong unless they make the child's life not worth living. Let us say that instead of taking a drug to retard the child, they waited until it was born. Then, they removed part of its brain, with the same sort of effects. They changed the circumstances of its life and thus created a new child, as God could theoretically alter the circumstances of one's life, changing the circumstances that he would use to establish (4). We can

press this example even further; the parents could have waited until the child was born, and then beat it, for no good reason. A child different from the one that would have existed otherwise becomes present. Perhaps it grows up to live a somewhat happy life, though being permanently handicapped. Then, are the parents perfect moral agents? I do not think so. The parents could beat their child every Tuesday and still maintain condition (4). In creating the circumstances of the child's life, they have violated the principle that Adams refers to as (Q), that is, "It is wrong to bring into existence, knowingly, a being less excellent than one could have brought into existence" (103). Here, by less excellent, I take him to mean one that suffers to a greater degree.

Adams insists that principle (Q) is not true, and that an overall good life is all that is required. He presents the example of a man who breeds goldfish rather than animals of higher intelligence. Most people would say that he is not wrong for doing this. Why is this, though? I think that this judgment reflects the unspoken assumptions that accompany the problem. I will assume that the being *X* suffers more than the being *Y*. To eliminate other aspects of the problem, let us say that the man, instead of breeding, possesses a cloning machine, which he can use to make either an *X* or a *Y*. The amount of care they require, and the amount of benefit that that man (or anyone else) could derive from them are equal (or in Gods' case, inconsequential). In addition, it is necessary that he pick one or the other. He can pick a being that suffers a little or a being that suffers a lot. All other things equal, I believe that it *would* be morally offensive to pick the *X* over the *Y*. Just as it would be wrong to beat up an innocent child (somehow maintaining condition (4)), thus creating a being that is handicapped. In both cases, unnecessary suffering is present.

Adams goes on to argue that if there was a drug that, when taken during pregnancy, could allow a child to develop greater intelligence and therefore happiness, the parents would not be wrong if they chose not to take the drug. However, this example is loaded with things that *sound* intuitively wrong. He uses the words "abnormal," "superhuman," "superior." We must take seriously his condition that all other things are equal. In other words, the child will not be an outcast because of this, there are no negative effects of the drug, the parents will not have to pay for the drug, and it will not pave the way for bizarre and repulsive genetic engineering in the distant future. In this case, I believe that the parents would in fact be wrong in deciding that their child should be less happy than it could be. Likewise, parents who neglect their child's education and intellectual development are wrong.

Adams is attempting to discredit the theory (P), "If a perfectly good moral agent created any world at all, it would have to be the very best

world that he could create" (91). In this statement, "best" needs to mean morally best, perfectly good. He attempts to sidestep the issue by saying that we do not have to be perfectly intelligent; intelligence is only important here, though, insofar it concerns suffering. But even if it is maintained that a creator does not wrong beings by *creating* them, it cannot be that the same creator does not ever wrong beings by *harming* them. Essentially, for God, these two actions are identical. Adams makes a very significant metaphysical distinction between God creating a being and God doing things to a being, which he cannot maintain.

Condition (4) alone does not seem adequate for our standards. Not only is it not true of the world we live in, but also is not reflective of a perfectly moral being. Let us say that I have a cat, which I routinely beat with a stick. However, the cat occasionally gets away from me and recovers so that his life is worth living, only to be beaten again. His life satisfies condition (4). Does that make me a perfectly moral being? I am creating the circumstances of his life, and thus who the cat is. If God is omnipotent, and creating our circumstances and lives, then he is in a position towards me that is the similar to the position I have towards my cat. If he were perfectly *moral*, he would not make a decision that was not perfectly moral. He would have no reason to make a child suffer, because he could just as easily stop the suffering. In fact, if we were judging a human, it would be morally reprehensible.

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Misreading or Miswriting? *The Author Carolyn Chute vs. The* *Readers of The Beans of Egypt, Maine*

Katy Smith

First published in 1985, Carolyn Chute's *The Beans of Egypt, Maine* was a best-seller and a source of excitement for the literary world (Christopher 106). However, according to the author, nearly everyone who read the novel missed the point. Chute wanted the book to make people "care about the working poor" and realize that "we are not all born equal" (qtd. in Christopher 112); instead, most critics and many readers focused on the possibility of incest between the narrator Earlene and her father, Lee, to the point that some reviews of the book were centered entirely around incest and failed to deal at all with Chute's depiction of the lower class (112). This disparity of focus between author and readers is made all the more interesting by Chute's claim that there is nothing incestuous about the relationship between these characters. She has addressed the issue of incest in interviews as well as in a postscript, included in the most recent printing of the novel, in which she attempts to correct what she calls "misconceptions that many readers have about the characters that I can't live with" (Chute 273). This paper examines the possible sources of these "misconceptions," synecdochally using a specific scene as an example of how the book as a whole could be "misread." It goes on to question the techniques Chute uses to communicate her purpose and suggests that they are incompatible with her target audience.

The most controversial and, according to Chute, most misread, scene in the novel is related by the character Earlene. Growing up next door to the Beans, a family that represents the lowest of the lower-class, Earlene is taught by her father, Lee (her mother, who suffers from chronic depression, is away at a medical facility throughout Earlene's childhood, and only surfaces for the occasional visit), to look upon them with disgust while her grandmother fills her head with a version of fire-and-brimstone Christianity which clearly determines that the Beans will end up in hell. Nonetheless, the Beans hold a peculiar fascination for Earlene, and she strays from the teachings of her childhood when she becomes a Bean herself through marriage.

In the scene in question, however, Earlene is a young girl, around seven years old. As she tells us,

Daddy gets a pain in his back after dinnah so we take a nap. We get under the covers and I scratch his back. Daddy says to take off my socks and shoes and overalls to keep the bed from gettin' full of dirt.

After I'm asleep the bed starts to tremble. I clutch the side of the bed and look around. Then I realize it's only Rubie Bean comin' in his loggin' truck to eat his dinnah with other Beans. Daddy's bare back is khaki-color like his carpenter's shirts. I give his shoulder blades a couple more rakes, then dribble off to sleep once more. (Chute 4)

In the postscript, Chute clearly states her view of this scene: "There is no incest between the father Lee and the daughter Earlene ... As I read the nap scene over and over, I wonder what makes people see incest" (Chute 273). Indeed, to hear Earlene tell it, this scene is quite ordinary. The plain, direct language Chute gives her character would seem to suggest that father and daughter usually share a bed, that Daddy is exercising normal parental concern for cleanliness when he instructs his daughter to remove her shoes and overalls, and that Earlene scratches her father's back out of a desire to show natural affection and appreciation. There is nothing in the actual language of the scene to suggest that Earlene is twisting the facts or that she is telling only half of the truth, holding back details that could arouse suspicion in the mind of the reader. It is the blunt, uncensored speech of a child who simply tells it like it is, who is innocent enough not to realize that outsiders might find the situation questionable.

And yet, it is a father and daughter in bed together, clothing removed, and the bed is trembling regardless of the cause to which Earlene attributes it. Earlene's grandmother, who appears in the next scene, certainly finds the situation troubling. She describes it as "a situation where temptation might come," and though Daddy responds by saying "It don't mean nuthin'. She's just a baby!," he does get "brick-color dots" on his cheeks when Earlene tells Gram that she sleeps with her father every night (Chute 6-7). Do the connotations of these details override the apparent denotations of Earlene's version of events? Is there, in fact, incest?

Literary critic Bertha Harris, writing for *The New York Times Book Review*, not only says yes but also disagrees with my interpretation of the language Chute gives Earlene. Harris believes that incest is indeed made obvious through Earlene's description of the nap. Claiming that Earlene speaks in "the fake ingenuous style of child actors transmitting sexual innuendo," she has no doubt that the relationship between father and daughter is incestuous (Harris 7). She even goes so far as to suggest that

the book is a book not about poverty, which underlies nearly every thought and action of the characters, but is instead a book about “the metaphysics of incest—and of father-daughter incest particularly” (7). Her audacious claims are, in her mind, perfectly valid, because according to her Chute has made this focus clear in the text.

For her part, Chute freely admits to incest between the characters of Beal Bean and his aunt (277), Roberta, while steadfastly denying any sexual relationship between Earlene and her father Lee (273). In her response to Harris’s claims and those of other reviewers, Chute suggests that classism is at the root of the accusations: “I think a lot of people just assumed it was incest because the characters are poor, and that made me really mad” (qtd. in Christopher 112). Renny Christopher, in an article published in *American Letters and Commentary*, seems to acknowledge some truth in her statement, although Christopher is not as critical of the book’s readers. Rather than viewing the general reaction to the nap scene as symbolic of prejudicial views the middle-class holds against the poor, she believes that readers “have found Chute’s characters almost impossible to empathize with, perhaps because the characters’ experience is so far removed from [them], or perhaps because of a failure of imagination on the part of the [readers], or both” (Christopher 109). She suggests that readers see incest because of a lack of experience with those who live in poverty, rather than because of a wish to condemn the poor, and goes on to note “the lack of understanding that the reviewers have for the characters—the way the reviewers are repulsed by the characters” (109-10).

This view almost seems to exonerate the reader. After all, it can hardly be a flaw of conscience to fail to understand something you can in no way identify with. However, in this particular instance, it is interesting to question just how difficult it is for the reader to stretch his or her imagination. If middle-class readers are so disturbed by the hard-knock life presented in the book that they would prefer to ignore it to the point of shifting the focus of the entire novel to something like incest, how much more disturbing is it for those who actually live that life? Couldn’t a father and daughter, whose lives are marked by hard work, an intensely dominating mother/grandmother, and an absent, depressed wife and mother, simply need to be near each other, regardless of their social class? The book never mentions friends of either Lee or Earlene, so it is assumed that Lee is all Earlene has, and vice-versa. They turn to each other because there is no one else to turn to. When a father hugs his daughter, it is viewed as a form of comfort without being sexually charged; why can’t sharing a bed be viewed in the same way? Is it, as Chute suggests, simply because the characters are poor? Or is it because

Chute has failed her readers and neglected to give them the proper framework for judging the characters and their lifestyle?

In her postscript, Chute ponders this problem: "I go over and over these scenes in my mind, wondering, wondering, wondering. How much of this misinterpretation is due to poor writing? How much of this, no matter how it is written, is due to the deep chasm between the classes?" (Chute 276). Her language here is loaded as well as problematic. By "misinterpretation," does Chute really mean to imply that there is only one correct interpretation of the novel, the one she had in mind when writing it? Does she believe that meaning in a text is synonymous with authorial intent? The theories of American literary critic E. D. Hirsch explore this view, although somewhat unsatisfactorily. Hirsch accepts the idea that a text's meaning is what the author had in mind at the time of writing; it is "absolute and immutable," even if no one other than the author knows what it is (Eagleton 67). In fact, no one else can know, because he believes this meaning is pre-linguistic, a product of what the author "wills" it to be (67). This willed meaning is a "wordless mental act which is then 'fixed' for all time" when it is set down in print (67). Here Hirsch runs into two problems. First, if meaning is pre-linguistic, how can the author herself really be sure what her meaning is? Is there a will, separate from a mind, that has a special kind of wordless knowledge? The second and more serious problem arises regardless of whether or not we accept the role of the will. Language is not a mirror, and pre-linguistic knowledge (indeed, any knowledge) is changed when it is put into words. The intent of the will cannot be the intent of the spoken or written word, simply because language distorts rather than perfectly reflects. In a broad sense, this idea can be applied to the nap scene. Chute's intent, when the scene was conceived or "willed," might not have been incest, but by putting the idea of the scene into words she opened it up to misinterpretation.

For now, however, let us ignore this failure to account for the problems of language and return to the main point of Hirsch's theory, the claim that meaning is equivalent to the author's intent. Because a reader cannot know the thoughts of the author, he or she can only strive to understand the author's "intrinsic genre," the general worldview that influenced the author at the time of writing, and from there "reconstruct the author's probable intentions" for the work in question (Eagleton 68, 70). The problem with this reconstruction is similar to the problems of language: there are too many open ends, too many ways in which the reader can go wrong. For example, when the idea of the intrinsic genre is applied to the situation at hand, it is obvious that Chute's readers and reviewers so drastically misinterpreted the novel's meaning because they

failed in the basic reconstruction of her most likely intentions. In fact, rather than seeking out the actual circumstances that influenced her writing of *Beans*, they attempted to create circumstances for her. Despite the fact that she has lived in poverty most of her life, the possibility that the book's focus was poverty was for the most part ignored. But because readers wanted to see incest, many decided that Chute herself must have experience with incest (which she denies), with some even going so far as to accuse her of writing the book in order to work through her remaining issues (Chute 274). This seems to separate the poverty in the book from the alleged incest; readers aren't tying the two together, but are evaluating them separately and choosing to focus on only one. But why do they choose incest instead of poverty?

One answer to this question is fairly obvious and is wholly determined by the text: the nap scene occurs at the very beginning of the novel, before any poverty has been revealed. Indeed, so little is known about Earlene and Lee at this point in the text that they could be a family from any social class; by the time more is known, it is likely that the reader has already created his or her case for or against the theme of incest. The fact that this judgment is formed so early in the reading of *Beans* further distances it from any class-based prejudices, and because it is such a touchy theme and is suggested to the reader so early in the text, it could feasibly overshadow deeper but less titillating issues such as poverty.

If the misinterpretation of this scene and, in a greater sense, the novel, is not due, as Chute would like to think, to simple middle-class detest of the poor, our study should perhaps examine more in-depth the reasons behind readers' reactions to the text, including their decision to focus on incest. To this end, it is useful to employ the theories of the reader-response school of literary criticism. In the reader-response view, "the text itself is really no more than a series of 'cues' to the reader;" there are gaps that must be filled and indeterminacies that must be reconciled by the reader before the text can be complete as a literary work or, as Wolfgang Iser says, "concretized" (Eagleton 76-77). For Iser, meaning cannot exist apart from the reader. A text alone has no meaning; it is concretized when it "registers on the reader's consciousness," and when it is concretized "the reader automatically views the text from his or her personal worldview" (Bressler 72). Here, meaning is not an independent object, as it is to Hirsch, but a happening (Iser 22).

This does not mean that because meaning is made personal to each reader through the reading process there can be any number of variant but correct interpretations. In the reader-response school, it is the job of the author to limit these interpretations and guide the reader in forming

his or her response to the work. The Polish critic Roman Ingarden sees the work of literature as an "organic whole," which means that the reader is not free to interpret it any way he or she pleases. Instead, the reader is to fill in the gaps in accordance with the implicit guidelines imbedded in the text (Eagleton 80). A "good" reader will be sensitive to these guidelines and will not overstep the boundaries of his or her position; the reader-derived meaning will thus be enough in accordance with the author's views that no major discord will erupt. In the case of *Beans*, though, there has been an exceptional amount of "misreading" amongst its audience. Is it possible, then, that the reader's misinterpretation is caused by Chute's writing?

At its most shallow, this question asks the obvious: if Chute didn't want there to be incest between Lee and Earlene, why have them in bed together at all? Her exact reasons may never be known, so in accordance with the reader-response view all that can be examined is the reader's responses to the scene and the conditions from which they arise. While I do not believe Chute's language in any way betrays incest, the entire situation is somewhat ambiguous. If Gram views it as a situation where Lee might be tempted to engage in incestuous activity, then it is obvious that the cues are present for the reader to interpret it as more than a simple nap. The situation of a father and daughter in bed together is not one that is frequently encountered, but when encountered, it is more often than not incestuous. Incest will most likely come to the reader's mind in passages such as this one as a result of past experiences with father-daughter bedroom scenes; in our scandal-ridden culture, this is practically a learned response. As the author, Chute's job here should be to defrock such a quick assumption for, as Ingarden notes, reading is not a linear activity. As a reader progresses through a work, previous interpretations and expectations are transformed and reshaped in accordance with new information gained (Eagleton 77). But Chute's ambiguity regarding Lee's relationship with Earlene continues throughout the text. She never gives the reader any reason to reevaluate his or her initial judgment, regardless of what that judgment may be. This ambiguity seems odd for a situation the author is so adamant about defining. If the scene is not open to interpretation, Chute certainly leaves a big indeterminacy for the reader to concretize, apparently without any guidelines. It almost seems as if she includes the scene simply in order to trap her readers, to call them on what she sees as their dirty minds and class prejudices. Her statement in the postscript that she "wonders what makes people see incest" (Chute 273), when taken literally, seems too naïve to be believable.

This is the main problem with the postscript and Chute's response

to her readers and reviewers. She consistently takes a holier-than-everyone position, claiming she is too pure or too clean-minded to understand unpleasant views of her characters. Just as she is too innocent to understand how anyone could possibly infer incest between a father and daughter in bed together, she is too sensitive to grimace in disgust when during dinner "Pip laughs. Chewed up bread drops from his mouth to his plate" (Chute 41). Chute's general reaction to any negative criticism of her characters is not only that the critic is wrong but that he or she has unforgivable moral defects.

In responding to Chute, it is important to seriously question the relationship between her purpose in writing *Beans* and her chosen audience. Chute has said that she wants "whoever reads [her] book to care about the working poor" (qtd. in Christopher 112), and that is certainly a noble goal for any author. In terms of audience, it can safely be assumed that the readers she had in mind were middle- or upper middle-class; if they were themselves lower class they would not need to be persuaded to care, and the characters in the novel suggest that few people who live below the poverty line ever curl up with a good book. This is sensible, as a writer should target an audience that reads. What does not make sense is the apparent incompatibility between the way Chute attempts to communicate her purpose and the audience that is on the receiving end.

Valerie Miner, writing about *Beans* in *The Times Literary Supplement*, believes that "Carolyn Chute tries here to shake up bourgeois expectations, to shock readers into a recognition of their own inhibitions and prejudices" (qtd. in Christopher 115). But, according to Chute, this was not her intent. The novel was not written to shock; as Christopher recognizes, "it is not a work of social activism." Rather, Chute has simply "written about her milieu, rendering it accurately and lovingly" (115). If Christopher is correct, this statement further highlights the split between Chute's purpose and the way in which "the [readers] are repulsed by the characters" (110).

This split can be illustrated by Iser's analogy of the construction of meaning. Iser writes that meaning is created in the space between the two poles of the artistic (the author's text) and the aesthetic ("the realization accomplished by the reader") (21). This means that both the author and the reader must step out of their isolation so that they may meet somewhere in the middle. It is here that Chute has failed in her responsibility to the reader, for if it is imperative that the reader consider the author while concretizing a work, it is at least as necessary for the author to work under the same type of consideration for her readers, to truly meet them in the middle.

Chute writes about characters the average middle-class reader can't understand; the readers and the characters are almost literally from two different worlds. Interestingly, Chute doesn't seem to even attempt to equip readers with the tools they need to connect with the characters. As our examination of the nap scene has shown, one way in which Chute fails to do this is by ignoring the fact that the way in which readers create meaning in fiction is determined in large part by their previous experiences with similar situations (Eagleton 6). If a reader is conditioned to view a father and daughter in bed together as incest or a family that chews with their mouths open and throws food as dirty or animalistic, the author, should she include such scenes but insist on a different interpretation, owes it to the reader to give clues or guidelines as to the interpretation that best fits the text or the author's intentions. Chute is ambiguous on these matters throughout the text. In a perfect world, a world where everyone really has an equal chance and class differences are nonexistent, such clarification would be unnecessary. But for Chute to acknowledge the chasm between her readers and her characters and not attempt to in any way overcome it is irresponsible authorship. If it is necessary for a reader to consider the author's background and worldview, it is necessary for the author to do the same for the reader.

What exists here is a deep, unresolved conflict between the dual goals of an author being true to her subject while still being sensitive to her audience. Indeed, if an artist loves characters for their flaws, he or she does not want to sentimentalize them but desires to represent them as they are; to temper the true nature of the characters would be to violate the artistic conscience. Yet, when this authenticity thoroughly alienates the author from his or her intended audience, the blame cannot be placed solely on the readers. Just as meaning is shared due to the transaction between text and reader, so too are any problems that arise out of it.

Chute's novel suffers from an inability to reconcile her purpose with her audience, and this leads to frustration and animosity between the author and her critics. Because Chute cannot comprehend her readers' general worldview, and because that worldview plays such a crucial role in the formation of a text's meaning, she in essence does not know what she wrote; she is familiar with her original intent, but that is all. In this way, it is actually the author, rather than the reader, who fails to understand the literary work.

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Erotophobia-Erotophilia: Individual Differences in Cognitive Processing

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Abstract

The present study examined the proposed interference in cognitive processing for sexual stimuli in erotophobes and erotophiles utilizing an emotional Stroop task. Participants made timed color judgments about sex, positive, negative, and neutral words. Results were mixed and indicated few differences in cognitive processing of sexual stimuli at an automatic level of analysis. However, in previous research, during more deliberate, focused processing of sexual information differences became evident. This focused processing may generate current concern, which is necessary for interference to occur in other non-clinical populations. Proposed variability in associative networks does not underlie differential responses of erotophobes and erotophiles to automatically processed sexual information.

People process sexual cues in their environment based on differences in personality such as the individual difference variable erotophobia-erotophilia. Erotophobia-erotophilia is defined as a tendency to respond to sexual cues along a continuum of affect with negative and positive poles (Fisher, Byrne, White, & Kelley, 1988; Gilbert & Gamache, 1984). The development of the personality variable erotophobia-erotophilia is hypothesized to be a result of socialization. Positive sexual affect, or erotophilia, results from learned associations between sexual information and positive stimuli, such as physical pleasure. Conversely, the associations learned in erotophobia are between sexual information and aversive stimuli, for example parental punishment (Fisher et al, 1988). These learned associations extend into areas of personal health such as sexual dysfunction, perceived vulnerability to unplanned pregnancy, sexual behavior during pregnancy and postpartum, self-breast examination, sexual education, communication between sexual partners, ability to judge persuasiveness of sexual advertisements, and contraceptive use (Fisher et al, 1988; Helweg-Larsen & Howell, 2000).

Literature Review

In addition to differences in health-related behaviors and

perceptions, erotophobia has been shown to have an impact on judgment and memory processes for sex-related information. For example, Lewis, Gibbons, & Gerrard (1986) asked sexually active women to recall information from passages dealing with moral dilemmas concerning sex. Results showed that women with high sex guilt or erotophobia had more difficulty remembering information from the sexual passages and demonstrated an increase in discrepancies in their own decision making concerning sexual issues than women with low sex guilt. Gerrard and Luus (1995) suggests that erotophobes may have difficulty processing sexual information. In their study, women are asked to make judgements about the probability of becoming pregnant based on situations varying in contraceptive use and sexual frequency. Results indicated that the accuracy in estimates of pregnancy was impeded in erotophobic women compared to erotophilic women. Geer and Judice (1994) investigated possible gender differences in memory for reading and recalling information from a narrative that included sexual content. Erotophobia-erotophilia was correlated with reading time in that erotophobes read sexually related sentences slower, and in fact were slower than erotophobes across all categories. They suggest two different ways to interpret the results, first that this may be due to the fact that the material is atypical and that infrequent exposure to the material increased the reading times for erotophobes. Secondly, because it may produce greater emotion and thus take longer for erotophobes to process the information.

Erotophobia-erotophilia also has been shown to affect processing of information concerning safer sex. Becker and Byrne (1985) showed that erotophobes spend less time viewing the sexual information than erotophiles and thus may result in erotophiles insufficient knowledge about contraception. Helweg-Larsen and Howell (2000) investigated the reduced possibility for erotophobes to take a central route, when individuals use past experience and knowledge in the judgement of certain arguments, in information processing about sexual material. When exposed to varying strengths of condom advertisements all women were persuaded more by strong arguments. However, erotophobic women were persuaded more by weak arguments than were erotophilic. They suggest this is due to erotophobic women not processing the sexually related material and thus the weak advertisements appeared relatively stronger. Their results also indicated that erotophiles reported greater comfort with the advertisements than erotophobes, which is consistent with other research that suggests that erotophobic women are uncomfortable with and avoid sexual information when possible (Becker & Bryne, 1985). Their finding that erotophobic women are less likely to participate in safer sex and that they

avoid sexually related advertisement demonstrates the importance of further investigation of what mechanisms are involved in this personality variable of consequence (Helweg-Larsen & Howell, 2000).

Models of Associative Networks and Affect

Smith, Eggleston, Gerrard and Gibbons (1996) proposed that basic differentiated cognitive processing of information in erotophobes and erotophiles underlies this personality variable. Smith et al's assertion arises from models of associative memory. Associative models of memory, in which ideas are represented as nodes and linked pathways among nodes, are widely accepted models of memory organization (e.g., Collins & Loftus, 1975). Similarly, Bowers has proposed an associative network model of affect (Bowers, 1981). In this model affect and the events associated with it are represented as separate nodes coupled by a pathway. In this way the affect connected to a situation greatly influences the structure of its corresponding associative network. Specific to Smith et al negative affect associated with sexual information in erotophobes forms a different network than positive affect associated with sexual information in erotophiles, leading to differences in judgment of perceived vulnerability to unplanned pregnancy and analogous situations. Smith et al (1996) explored these associations in individuals who react to sexual cues with negative affect by applying a word-pairs task.

Smith et al (1996) investigated the relationship between perceived vulnerability to unplanned pregnancy and cognitive associative networks of erotophobics. Participants were asked to rate the similarity between word pairs from four categories: positive ambiguous, negative ambiguous, positive sex, and negative sex. Results supported the hypothesis that the association between negative and sexual words is stronger in erotophobics, while the opposite is true of erotophilics, with stronger associations occurring between positive and sexual words. Smith et al (1996) concluded that this negative affect in erotophobics interferes with the ability to process sexual information.

The Emotional Stroop Task

An effective tool for measuring interference in processing of information, or cognitive bias, is an emotional Stroop task. In the original version (Stroop, 1935), participants are asked to identify the ink color of the target words. Target words are congruent or incongruent names of colors. Color naming response and the automaticity involved in reading the target word compete resulting in interference. In clinical populations, Stroop interference is greatest when the words are relevant to the

individuals' psychopathology (for a review see Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996).

Kindt and Brosschot (1997) investigated interference using an emotional Stroop task. Spider-phobic and non-spider-phobic participants were presented with threatening spider-related pictorial and linguistic stimuli. Bias, as indicated by slowed reaction time, was measured by spider-phobic participants' inability to ignore anxiety-producing threat-related stimuli. Results illustrate that spider-phobic participants have slower reaction times for both pictorial and linguistic spider-related stimuli. Although this study employed an emotional Stroop task using a clinical population, the current study investigates a non-clinical population, erotophobia-erotophilia.

Overview

The purpose of the present study was to investigate Smith et al's (1996) claim that erotophobes and erotophiles processes sexual information differently. Smith et al (1996) proposed that basic differentiated associative networks of information in erotophobes and erotophiles underlie this differential processing of sexual cues. While this explanation for the underlying differences between erotophobes and erotophiles is plausible, it has yet to be adequately tested. To examine hypothesized interference in cognitive processing, the present study employed an emotional Stroop task, in which participants made color judgments about words, some of which were sexual. Based on previous associations with sexual information and punishment and/or fear, it is expected that erotophobes will be hypervigilant to sexual cues, which are read automatically, in the Stroop task. Attentional bias results from an impairment in performance due to selective attention to emotionally relevant stimuli during processing of the information, so it is expected that color-naming of sexual words will be slower in erotophobics. Therefore, cognitive interference is expected to be greatest for sexual stimuli in erotophobes compared to erotophiles such that erotophobes would have slower reaction times to sexual words than would erotophiles (Williams, Matthews, & MacLeod, 1996).

Method

Participants

Participants were recruited from undergraduate social science classes. During group screening sessions participants completed three surveys. At a later date participants returned to complete the Erotophobia-Erotophilia Stroop task. Of the initial 132 participants who

completed the surveys 115 returned; of these 109 were used in the final analysis. Among the returning participants, the erotophilic group consisted of 28 women and 29 men and the erotophobic group consisted of 41 women and eight men according to the criteria of the Sexual Opinion Survey (Fisher et al, 1988). The mean SOS score for erotophobes was $M = 39.31$, $SD = 12.30$, and for erotophiles was $M = 76.25$, $SD = 12.07$. Participants were compensated for participation by receiving extra credit and/or participation credit in their undergraduate class.

Materials

Sexual Opinion Survey. To quantify the erotophobia-erotophilia construct White et al (1977), designed the Sexual Opinion Survey (SOS); a twenty-one-item questionnaire scored on a seven point Likert-type scale. The items assess reactions to a range of sexual behaviors, fantasies, and visual stimuli (White et al, 1977). Fisher et al (1988) revised the original language to incorporate updated terminology. The revised survey is highly correlated to the original scale, $r(321) = .92$, $p < .001$, which was highly reliable and valid. In accordance with the original guidelines scores were divided along a standard median split with lower scores reflecting erotophobia and higher scores erotophilia. Scores range from zero, most erotophobic, to 126, most erotophilic.

Erotophobia-Erotophilia Stroop task. The stimuli for the Erotophobia-Erotophilia Stroop task were divided into four categories of 12 words each: sex related, positive ambiguous, negative ambiguous, and neutral ambiguous (see Table 1). Negative ambiguous words and positive ambiguous words were used to exclude the possibility that slowed or facilitated reaction times were simply a result of negative or positive affect, respectively. Neutral ambiguous stimuli were included to provide a baseline for comparison of other words. Words across three categories (positive, negative, and neutral ambiguous) were matched for number of syllables and frequency (Bellezza, Greenwald, & Banaji, 1986). Although unable to norm the sex-related words, they were assumed to be of low frequency. Each of the 48 stimuli were presented twice in each of the four colors: red, green, blue, and black, yielding 384 total experimental trials. All the stimuli were randomized with three restrictions, that the same word, word type, or color did not repeat itself on consecutive trials. Words were presented in the center of the screen in 24-point Times New Roman characters on a white background. The dependent variable, response time (RT), was measured from presentation of stimulus until response.

The Erotophobia-Erotophilia Stroop task was administered to

participants individually using E-Prime software, version 1.1 (2002). The computers used in the experiment were 400 MHz Pentium II personal computers with 15"-17" screens.

Procedure

This study employed a 2 (erotophobia, erotophilia) x 4 (positive ambiguous, negative ambiguous, neutral ambiguous, and sex words) between subjects design. The Sexual Opinion Survey (SOS) by Fisher et al. (1988) was administered during group screening sessions along with two other paper and pencil surveys. 115 participants returned for the Erotophobia-Erotophilia Stroop task. Before the experiment began, participants were informed that words would be presented but were not informed of the nature of the words. Participants were instructed to ignore the word stimuli and report the ink color as quickly and accurately as possible. Participants received instructions on how to perform the task according to specific color-coded keys on the keyboard, the corresponding key for red "d", green "f", blue "j", and black "k". Participants first completed 48 practice trials to become familiar with the keyboard and Erotophobia-Erotophilia Stroop task. Next, participants completed eight blocks of 48 trials with reminder instructions and an optional rest period between blocks. After completion of the Erotophobia-Erotophilia Stroop task participants were debriefed according to Mills (1976).

Results

A total of 1.1% of trials were eliminated by excluding reaction times below 300 ms and above 1620 ms, two standard deviations below and above the mean. Only correct responses were included in final analyses, although when incorrect responses were included no statistical differences were noted. A total of nine participants were excluded in the final analyses: three were color-blind or had English as a second language, and six had improbable response times.

A 2 X 2 ANOVA was conducted to assess reaction times (RT) of erotophobes and erotophiles to sex trials compared to a baseline of neutral trials. There was no significant interaction between SOS and trial type, $F(1, 104) = 0.564$, $p > 0.05$. Erotophobes and erotophiles did not differ in their reaction time to sex or neutral words. (erotophobe/sex, $M = 821.59$, $SD = 90.44$; erotophobe/neutral, $M = 817.97$, $SD = 92.18$; erotophile/sex, $M = 810.33$, $SD = 81.85$; erotophile/neutral, $M = 812.88$, $SD = 79.09$). In addition, a t-test of RT to sex trials by SOS was not significant, $t(104) = 0.662$, $p > 0.05$.

To compare reaction times (RT) across all four word types according

to SOS status (erotophobia/erotophilia) a 2 X 4 omnibus ANOVA was conducted. The 2 X 4 omnibus ANOVA revealed a significant interaction between SOS status and word type, $F(3, 312) = 2.622$, $p = 0.051$. With all trial types in the analysis, RTs of erotophobes and erotophiles to sex trials differed significantly, ($M = 821.6$, $M = 810.3$, respectively), refer to Figure 1. However, variance in the upper and lower bounds of the sex words category overlap between erotophobes and erotophiles, suggesting that something other than the variable of interest may be causing the interaction. A repeated measures ANOVA performed for RTs of erotophobes supported the predicted pattern of responses, $F(3, 306) = 9.22$, $p < 0.01$, with erotophobes reacting slowest to sex words compared to all other word types. Several analyses with gender as a variable were conducted; none were significant and therefore were excluded from further analyses.

Discussion

The results indicate that erotophobes and erotophiles do not process sexual information differently at a basic, or automatic level, as determined by the emotional Stroop task. This contradicts Smith et al's (1996) claim that erotophobes have stronger cognitive associations between negative and sexual words than do erotophiles. They suggest that differences exist at an automatic level of analysis, affecting judgments of perceived vulnerability to unplanned pregnancy. However, in Smith et al's (1996) design current concern, or state anxiety, may have been introduced through prolonged interaction with the aversive stimuli. Unlike trait anxiety, which refers to the persisting emotions that are a result of temperament or individual differences like erotophobia-erotophilia, state anxiety is a result of momentary emotions resulting from the current situation. Focussed processing, which is engaged during decision making about issues like unplanned pregnancy like the ones employed in Smith et al's (1996) design, may generate current concern which has been shown in previous research to be necessary for interference to occur in other non-clinical populations (Helweg-Larsen & Howell, 2000; Fisher et al, 1988).

Possible Explanations

However, if differences exist in associative networks the emotional Stroop task, which engages automatic processing, should reveal these regardless of current concern. The results do not support this assertion but instead indicate that this individual personality variable does not have an impact at this level and may be more situationally specific than initially suggested. Bowers' (1981) emotional associative network theory

explains cognitive networks in terms of emotions and offers an explanation for activation that applies to the present results. This model which suggests that emotions, like ideas and events, are represented in associative networks proposes that activation of a particular emotional node can occur in one of two ways. An emotional node can become activated, or exceed its threshold, by the presentation of a stimulus directly related to that node, or through prior arousal of associated nodes to which it is linked (Bower, 1981). In terms of the present study, activation of the emotional node for fear in erotophobes would have to be directly activated by the automatic processing of a sex-related cue in order for interference to occur. Because this did not surface in the results, it is likely that prior activation or a deeper level of processing is required for cognitive bias to become evident. This could be induced by bringing sexually related information to current concern, or by manipulating state anxiety, as has been done in other non-clinical populations (Kindt & Brosschot, 1997).

Although the results do not support Smith et al (1996), another possible explanation that would not discount their claim is due to the possibility of strategic override. Strategic override, a compensation behavior described by Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod (1996) occurs when non-clinical individuals use explicit tactics to avoid emotional interaction with aversive stimuli, which causes interference with color naming responses. When this technique is employed a stimulus that has been associated with threat in the past, as a result of socialization, may be subject to neuromodulatory control, or the ability to shift attention within an environment (Williams, Matthews, & MacLeod, 1996). If erotophobes were engaging neuromodulatory control sex stimuli would trigger an increase in the attention paid to the output demand, or color-naming task, and would result in an increase in reaction time not only for sex-related stimuli, but across all trial types. This pattern is not reflected in the data and therefore the null results are not likely to be a result of strategic override or neuromodulatory control.

Another possible source of error is the lack of standardization in the interpretation of SOS scores. The partitioning of SOS scores into either erotophobia or erotophilia can be conducted in one of two ways; scores can be divided along a median split as in the current study, or by dividing scores into thirds allowing for extreme groups as in Helweg-Larsen & Howell (2000). Results may be influenced according to the method chosen. In order for consistent interpretation of studies utilizing SOS data, a standardized method should be implemented. Another area of concern related to the SOS is a difference in typical responses for men and women. Men are more likely to score in an erotophilic fashion than

women, which may be a result of social norms or possibly reflect male-biased questions, especially concerning pornography. Similar differences in scoring trends have been noted among populations that differ in age, socioeconomic status, and religious affiliation (Fisher et al, 1988). This is not as typical of other individual differences such as extroversion and introversion.

Future Directions

Due to the ambiguity of the current data and the social importance of erotophobia-erotophilia as an individual difference variable further study in this area is suggested. In order to eliminate potential sources for alternative explanations such as neuromodulatory control future studies should manipulate both trait and state anxiety for sex-related information. One possible method of doing this would be to replace the emotional Stroop task with an unconscious lexical decision task. In order to generate current concern administer the SOS immediately before the lexical decision task, incorporate a task that would require deeper processing of sexual information prior to testing, and use sex-related primes that would expose participants to repeated threatening stimuli at an unconscious level.

Erotophobia-erotophilia affects various areas of personal health and behavior as well as impacts judgments and memory processing of sexual information. In a society where it is becoming increasingly important for individuals to be responsible about sexual behavior, continued research and education concerning erotophobia-erotophilia is necessary.

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Table 1


Stimulus Words used in the Erotophobia-Erotophilia Stroop task

Word Type	Sex-Related	Positive Ambiguous	Negative Ambiguous	Neutral Ambiguous
	Sex	Cheer	Stress	Street
	Penis	Angel	Stupid	Patent
	Vagina	Perfection	Crucify	Industry
	Breast	Autumn	Maggot	Glacier
	Condom	Star	Rude	Square
	Masturbate	Ocean	Wicked	Trumpet
	Intercourse	Politeness	Suffocate	Context
	Orgasm	Treasure	Agony	Vehicle
	Erection	Millionaire	Decompose	Kerosene
	Clitoris	Sapphire	Horror	Orchestra
	Nipple	Paradise	Tragedy	History
	Scrotum	Waterfall	Menace	Shadow

Note. The mean valence for the Positive Ambiguous category is 4.47 on a scale from 1 (most negative) to 5 (most positive), the mean frequency is 2.63 on a scale from 1 (least frequent) to 5 (most frequent). The mean valence for the Negative Ambiguous category is 1.65; the mean frequency is 2.57. The mean valence for the Neutral Ambiguous category is 3.25; the mean frequency is 2.66.

Figure Captions

Figure 1. Reaction times to word type across SOS status. Slowest reaction time to sex words for erotophobes and negative words for erotophiles.



The Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen Paradox and Bell’s Inequality

Johannes Norrell

I. Abstract

The Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen paradox was first introduced in 1935 as a means to demonstrate that the current theory of quantum mechanics was lacking. Einstein was unsatisfied with the statistical nature of quantum mechanics and used the EPR paradox to suggest the existence of hidden variables and the possibility of a more deterministic physics. However, Bell later showed that such a system is impossible if one wishes to preserve the idea of local systems unaffected by what occurs far away. This paper summarizes the arguments of EPR and Bell.

II. Introduction


Quantum mechanics has met with an overwhelming degree of success since its conception, and it has managed to explain some unexpected phenomena that classical mechanics failed to account for. However, there are still many questions for which scientists have no satisfactory answers. One of these, first introduced in 1935, is that of the Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR) paradox¹. Whereas quantum mechanics is statistical in nature, EPR suggested that a more deterministic physics based on “hidden variables,” information about the particle state not included in the wave function, might exist. This was of particular interest to Bell, who wrote quite a bit about both the EPR experiment and the possibility of hidden variables. Ultimately, Bell concluded that a hidden variable scheme cannot be constructed unless one abandons the concept of locality. This paper will attempt first to describe the EPR experiment and the original conclusions that were drawn from it, and then to follow and explain Bell’s arguments concerning those conclusions.

III. The EPR Experiment

The EPR experiment can be described as follows²: a stream of protons is incident on a hydrogen target, as shown below. A proton will occasionally scatter, thus causing a proton from the hydrogen target to recoil. Two counting telescopes confirm when the protons pass through them and enter a spin filter, such as a Stern–Gerlach magnet. Each filter only allows particles with spins aligned along a particular axis to pass into a counter just beyond it. Because spins must be either aligned or anti-aligned (the two allowed eigenstates) and spins oriented differently

are forced to adopt one or the other state, half of a random distribution will be counted and half will not.

Figure 1. Experimental setup for observation of the EPR paradox².



The paradox results from the choices and apparent entanglement of the two protons. Because most particles do not enter the filters already in eigenstates, they must each choose one state and that choice is statistically random. However, the two counters never register both protons from a single scatter/recoil pair, so the separate random choices are in fact anticorrelated, despite being too far apart to influence each other. If the spin measurement of one proton cannot affect measurement of the other, the most logical way to explain the anticorrelation is to suggest that the result was somehow predetermined, and this is exactly what EPR suggested. However, the wave function of the system does not contain sufficient information to account for this predetermination, so EPR proposed the existence of "hidden variables," i.e., real elements of the system that are currently unidentified and inaccessible to direct measurement. The "EPR theorem" can be formally stated as follows³: "If the predictions of quantum mechanics are correct (even for systems made of remote correlated particles) and if physical reality can be described in a local (or separable) way, then quantum mechanics is necessarily incomplete: some 'elements of reality' exist in Nature that are ignored by this theory." This argument appears to be logically sound, but Bell subsequently showed that a scheme of hidden variables such as those EPR envisioned cannot exist.

IV. Hidden Variables

Bell published numerous articles^{2,4,5,6} concerning the EPR paradox and hidden variables. What follows is a detailed explanation of his principle argument showing that local hidden variables are not a viable option for explaining the anticorrelation observed in the EPR experiment, and that it would be impossible for such variables to exist.

Suppose that two particles in a singlet spin state (the state described above) are intercepted by a pair of Stern-Gerlach magnets that measure the spin components of the particles, σ_1 and σ_2 . The direction of the first detector is \mathbf{a} (where \mathbf{a} is a unit vector); the direction of the other is \mathbf{b} . The result of the measurement $\sigma_1 \cdot \mathbf{a}$ is called A ; the result of the measurement $\sigma_2 \cdot \mathbf{b}$ is called B . The particles are in a singlet state, which means the system has a net spin of zero. Each measurement must therefore give a value of ± 1 (up or down, left or right, etc), with $A = -B$. It is clear that A depends on \mathbf{a} and B on \mathbf{b} , but let us suppose that they also depend on some other parameter, a hidden variable (or set of hidden variables) λ . Now, A and B can be described as follows:

$$A(\mathbf{a}, \lambda) = \pm 1, B(\mathbf{b}, \lambda) = \pm 1 \quad (1)$$

The correlation function for these results can be written as follows:

$$P(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}) = \int \lambda p(\lambda) A(\mathbf{a}, \lambda) B(\mathbf{b}, \lambda) \quad (2)$$

where $p(\lambda)$ is the probability distribution of λ . The quantum mechanical result for the correlation function is:

$$\langle \sigma_1 \cdot \mathbf{a} \sigma_2 \cdot \mathbf{b} \rangle = -\mathbf{a} \cdot \mathbf{b} \quad (3)$$

The bracket notation in (3) indicates an expectation value, an average value of many measurements. It replaces the well-defined concepts of position, momentum, etc. that are found in classical physics. The expression (2) gives an equation for the probability of particular result averaged over all λ , i.e. the probability distribution for all hidden variables. The expectation value (3) gives the quantum mechanical result for the observed probability distribution, and the right hand side is the cosine of the angle between \mathbf{a} and \mathbf{b} . Thus, for the hidden variable scheme to successfully describe the system, the expression (2) must give the well established quantum mechanical result (3). It will be shown that this is impossible.

V. An Example

To illustrate the difficulties that one encounters when trying to formulate a scheme of hidden variables to satisfy the EPR result, Bell offers the following example⁵: suppose a particle has been prepared in a pure spin state (eigenstate) with direction \mathbf{p} . The particle has a hidden variable, λ , a unit vector distributed uniformly over the hemisphere $\lambda \cdot \mathbf{p}$


> 0 . The particle is then forced into a different eigenstate by passing through a Stern-Gerlach magnet oriented along the direction \mathbf{a} . Let us attempt to express the results of the measurement of $\sigma \cdot \mathbf{a}$ as:

$$\text{sign}(\lambda \cdot \mathbf{a}) \quad (4)$$

where the sign function returns a result of ± 1 , depending on the sign of its argument.

The expectation value $\langle \sigma \cdot \mathbf{a} \rangle$ can be found by averaging over all values of λ , which is easy to do since λ was specified to be uniform.

Figure 2. Averaging over λ to calculate the expectation value $\langle \sigma \cdot \mathbf{a} \rangle$.



The above figure serves as an aid in the averaging process. The angle between \mathbf{p} and \mathbf{a} is q . The darker shaded area denotes the region in which $\lambda \cdot \mathbf{a}$ is positive; the white area denotes the regions in which $\lambda \cdot \mathbf{a}$ is negative. Because λ is uniform across all regions, the terms contribute to the probability distribution (i.e. the expectation value) of $\sigma \cdot \mathbf{a}$ according to their proportion of the hemisphere's volume. Thus, the expectation value can be given as:

$$\langle \sigma \cdot \mathbf{a} \rangle = \langle \sigma \cdot \mathbf{a} \rangle = 1 \cdot \frac{\theta}{\pi} (+1) + \left(\frac{\theta}{\pi} \right) (-1) = \frac{2\theta}{\pi} \quad (5)$$

Note that while this analysis examines only the upper hemisphere, where λ is positive, the result would be unchanged if one were to also include the areas where λ is negative. The quantum mechanical result for the expectation value for the spin along \mathbf{a} is

$$\langle \sigma \cdot \mathbf{a} \rangle = \cos \theta \quad (6)$$

Clearly, (5) and (6) are not equivalent. As (6) is already well established,

the error must lie in the generation of (5). To account for this, let us introduce a new unit vector, \mathbf{a}' , which is obtained by rotating from \mathbf{a} toward \mathbf{p} until θ' satisfies

$$1 - \frac{2\theta'}{\pi} = \cos \theta \quad (7)$$

where θ' is the angle between \mathbf{a}' and \mathbf{p} . Now we can write a successful hidden-variable expression for the expectation value:

$$\langle \sigma \cdot \mathbf{a} \rangle = \text{sign}(\lambda \cdot \mathbf{a}') \quad (8)$$

While this gives the accurate quantum mechanical result, it is nonetheless an awkward expression because the spin along \mathbf{a} now depends on some other direction \mathbf{a}' , whose presence in this scheme results from a mathematical necessity and has no apparent physical meaning.

For a single particle, it is possible to reproduce the quantum mechanical result using a hidden variable scheme. However, a difficulty arises if we attempt to expand this explanation to cover the two-particle system in the EPR experiment. Let us define the results A and B as

$$A(\mathbf{a}, \lambda) = \text{sign}(\mathbf{a} \cdot \lambda), \quad B(\mathbf{b}, \lambda) = -\text{sign}(\mathbf{b} \cdot \lambda) \quad (9)$$

We can average over all values of λ as before, giving an expression for the correlation function

$$P(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}) = \left(1 - \frac{\theta}{\pi}\right)(-1) + \left(\frac{\theta}{\pi}\right)(+1) = -1 + \frac{2\theta}{\pi} \quad (10)$$

where θ is now the angle between \mathbf{a} and \mathbf{b} . This equation accurately describes the system at its extremum points. If \mathbf{a} and \mathbf{b} are parallel, then $\theta = 0$ and $P(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}) = -1$; the system is perfectly anticorrelated. Similarly, if \mathbf{a} and \mathbf{b} are orthogonal, then $\theta = \pi/2$ and $P(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}) = 0$; there is no correlation. However, it fails for all cases in between these extrema. Take $\theta = \pi/4$, for example. The expression (10) gives a correlation of $-1/2$ which is clearly not equal to the quantum mechanical result of $2^{-1/2}$. Thus, this scheme of hidden variables fails to accurately describe the two-particle system.

While this scheme of hidden variables is awkward and ultimately fails to describe a two-particle system, one might suspect that a better more successful scheme could be developed. This is the problem addressed by Bell; his most famous work will be presented in the following section.

VI. Bell's Inequality

Bell's most notable work in this field is the development of his inequality relations, which demonstrates why any local hidden variable scheme like the one presented in section V must fail. Bell presented this

proof in several slightly different manners^{2,5,6}, but here we will discuss the proof given in [5] to keep the notation consistent with that which has already been used.

Because the probability distribution, $\rho(\lambda)$, is normalized,

$$\int d\lambda \rho(\lambda) = 1 \quad (11)$$

Because $A(\mathbf{a}, \lambda)$ must equal $-B(\mathbf{b}, \lambda)$ if $\mathbf{a} = \mathbf{b}$, one can write

$$B(\mathbf{b}, \lambda) = -A(\mathbf{b}, \lambda) \quad (12)$$

It should be noted that in (12), Bell is *not* suggesting that the result of one measurement is dependent upon the orientation of the other detector. Each result is explicitly dependent upon only one direction, the direction in which the detector is oriented. In (12), Bell is stating that if the detectors happen to be oriented along the same direction, written here as \mathbf{b} , the results will be opposite. (12) can be substituted into the correlation function (2) to give

$$P(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}) = - \int d\lambda \rho(\lambda) A(\mathbf{a}, \lambda) A(\mathbf{b}, \lambda) \quad (13)$$

Because of the normalized probability distribution and the properties of (1), this function maintains the same range of values as the quantum mechanical result (3). This implies that for each λ the results for \mathbf{a} and \mathbf{b} are now fixed and hence predetermined. This is exactly what EPR suggested: that for a particular λ , the outcome is deterministic, just as in classical physics, and that the statistical nature of quantum mechanics results from an ignorance of the value(s) of λ . Thus, as before, the average over all λ should give the quantum mechanical expectation value.

Now let us introduce a third unit vector, \mathbf{c} . Using (13), we can see that

$$P(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}) - P(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{c}) = - \int d\lambda \rho(\lambda) A(\mathbf{a}, \lambda) A(\mathbf{b}, \lambda) + \int d\lambda \rho(\lambda) A(\mathbf{a}, \lambda) A(\mathbf{c}, \lambda) \quad (14)$$

$$= \int d\lambda \rho(\lambda) A(\mathbf{a}, \lambda) [A(\mathbf{c}, \lambda) - A(\mathbf{b}, \lambda)] \quad (15)$$

$$= \int d\lambda \rho(\lambda) A(\mathbf{a}, \lambda) A(\mathbf{b}, \lambda) \left[\frac{A(\mathbf{c}, \lambda)}{A(\mathbf{b}, \lambda)} - 1 \right] \quad (16)$$

Because $A = \pm 1$ and $1/-1 = -1$, this can also be written as

$$P(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}) - P(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{c}) = \int d\lambda \rho(\lambda) A(\mathbf{a}, \lambda) A(\mathbf{b}, \lambda) [A(\mathbf{b}, \lambda) A(\mathbf{c}, \lambda) - 1] \quad (17)$$

From (17) and the absolute value theorem, one can generate the inequality

$$|P(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}) - P(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{c})| \leq \int d\lambda \rho(\lambda) |A(\mathbf{a}, \lambda)| |A(\mathbf{b}, \lambda)| |A(\mathbf{b}, \lambda) A(\mathbf{c}, \lambda) - 1| \quad (18)$$

Because

$$|A(\mathbf{a}, \lambda)| = |A(\mathbf{b}, \lambda)| = 1 \quad (19)$$

$$|1 - A(\mathbf{b}, \lambda) A(\mathbf{c}, \lambda)| \geq |A(\mathbf{b}, \lambda) A(\mathbf{c}, \lambda) - 1| \quad (20)$$

one can rewrite (18) as

$$|P(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}) - P(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{c})| \leq \int d\lambda \rho(\lambda) [1 - A(\mathbf{b}, \lambda) A(\mathbf{c}, \lambda)] \quad (21)$$

Finally, the term on the right can be rewritten as follows:

$$\int d\lambda \rho(\lambda) [1 - A(\mathbf{b}, \lambda) A(\mathbf{c}, \lambda)] = \int d\lambda \rho(\lambda) - \int d\lambda \rho(\lambda) A(\mathbf{b}, \lambda) A(\mathbf{c}, \lambda) \quad (22)$$

$$= 1 + P(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{c}) \quad (23)$$

Substituting (23) into (21) yields

$$1 + P(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{c}) \geq |P(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}) - P(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{c})| \quad (24)$$


This is Bell's inequality.

The statement (24) shows why a scheme of hidden variables cannot successfully achieve the quantum mechanical result. At $\mathbf{b} = \mathbf{c}$, both the left and right hand sides of the equation equal zero. If you allow the angle between \mathbf{b} and \mathbf{c} to vary slightly, the right hand side will be of the order $|\mathbf{b} - \mathbf{c}|$. Because the right hand side will vary to the first order, the left-hand side cannot remain stationary. In other words, the left-hand side cannot increase more slowly than right-hand side without violating the expression. However, the quantum mechanical result, which depends on the cosine of the angle between \mathbf{b} and \mathbf{c} , is of second order; it cannot satisfy the inequality. A cosine function can be represented with the following power series:

$$\cos x = 1 - \frac{x^2}{2!} + \frac{x^4}{4!} - \frac{x^6}{6!} + \dots \quad (25)$$

This function is second-order because the it changes as x^2 when x is small. When one observes a small variance in the angle between \mathbf{b} and \mathbf{c} , the right-hand side of (24) therefore changes as an x^2 function, and the left-hand side as an absolute value function. As shown below, an absolute value function is clearly greater than an x^2 function for sufficiently small x :

Figure 3. First order vs. second order.



The inequality is violated if one uses a cosine function for $P(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{c})$. Thus, for any angle between $\mathbf{b} = \mathbf{c}$ and $\mathbf{b} \cdot \mathbf{c} = 0$, the quantum mechanical result cannot be obtained. This is exactly the difficulty that was encountered in section V; it is the difficulty that will necessarily occur for any scheme of local hidden variables.

VII. Locality

It is of considerable importance to note that the idea of locality is a major underlying assumption for this entire discussion. The measurement A , for example, depends on \mathbf{a} or \mathbf{b} , but never \mathbf{a} and \mathbf{b} . EPR suggested the existence of a deterministic, hidden variable-based quantum mechanics because they believed that it is impossible for something that happens in the distance to affect a local experiment. This is quite a reasonable assumption, as Bell points out². Suppose that the two particles in the EPR experiment pass through their detectors simultaneously. For the measurement of one to impact the other, information would have to propagate between the two faster than the speed of light—instantaneously! However, even Bell admits^{2,5} that if a hidden variable scheme of physics were possible, the instruments could also have hidden variables that would affect the system, and in a realm of physics where the observer and the experiment cannot be clearly separated, this is a possibility that cannot be ruled out completely. Moreover, he states that would indeed be possible to generate such a scheme. However, this does not make Bell's inequality any less valuable. It still shows us that a scheme of *local* hidden variables cannot account for the paradox of the EPR experiment. It is ironic that if hidden variables exist, they would have to be used in a nonlocal manner, quite contrary to the original idea held by Einstein.

VIII. Paradox?

Judging from these arguments, one can conclude that there is a deficiency in our understanding of quantum mechanics; somehow this must be explained. However, it is possible that the EPR "paradox" is not a paradox at all. When Bohr was presented with this problem, he replied merely to say that Einstein was asking a disallowed question³, which is the view held by the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics today. The two particles in the EPR experiment are entangled, so it may be impossible to isolate or even define the wave function for a single one of them. If this is the case, it would likewise be impossible to examine a single particle without the other; measuring the spin of one would yield information on both and therefore alter both. This seems a reasonable

explanation, but many physicists do not find it satisfactory. Because of this, the implications of the EPR experiment still draw the interest of many scientists over 65 years after its conception.

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- ¹ A. Einstein, B. Podolsky and N. Rosen, *Physics Review* 47, 777 (1933).
 - ² J.S. Bell, "Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Experiments." *Proceedings of the symposium on Frontier Problems in High Energy Physics*. Pisa, June 1976, 33-45.
 - ³ F. Laloë, "Do we really understand quantum mechanics? Strange correlations, paradoxes, and theorems." *Am. J. Phys.* 69 (6), June 2001.
 - ⁴ J.S. Bell, "On the problem of hidden variables in quantum theory." *Rev. Mod. Phys.* 38 (1966), 447-52.
 - ⁵ J.S. Bell, "On the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox." *Physics* 1 (1964) 195-200.
 - ⁶ J.S. Bell, "Introduction to the hidden-variable question." *Proceedings of the International School of Physics 'Enrico Fermi', course 1L: Foundations of Quantum Mechanics*. New York, Academic (1971) 171-81.

German Foreign Policy Under Bismarck and Kaiser William II

Charles Roberts

The foreign policy of imperialism can be extremely complex. The reasons for a nation's expansionist policies can cover any number of motivations. It is unusual, however, for the motivations of a nation to change so much, and in so short a time, as they did in imperial Germany between the period of the leadership of Otto von Bismarck and the First World War. Having complete control of Prussia's and then Germany's foreign policy, most of Bismarck's motives were decidedly domestic, or at least determined by matters within Germany. His dismissal by Kaiser William II marked an almost total turnaround in German foreign policy.

William wanted Germany to be a world power, quite a change from Bismarck's oft-repeated claim that Germany was a "satiated state."¹ While it would be impossible to demonstrate every case of Bismarck's foreign policy being determined primarily by domestic considerations, a few situations most clearly illustrate this tendency. The 1866 war with Austria, for example, was one waged in order to establish and demonstrate Prussia's leadership of Germany.² Similarly, Prussia's war with France was one which Bismarck recognized could be used towards his goal of solidifying Prussian power within Germany by the creation of a Second Reich.³ Kaiser William II's goals for foreign policy were diametrically opposed to those held by Bismarck. William engaged in a costly naval race with Britain which not only encouraged anti-German sentiment in Britain but also required fomenting more anti-British sentiment in Germany, a dangerous combination for Germany when Britain could be the decisive factor tipping the scales of power.⁴ The Kaiser also was willing to push France and Britain closer together in his pursuit of a German empire by his provocations in the Moroccan Crises of 1905 and 1911. Eventually, William's belligerency would lead to the encirclement which German planners felt made it necessary to support Austria in 1914, support which would lead to World War I.⁵ The

¹ Dietrich Orlow, *A History of Modern Germany*, (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey, 2002), p. 34.

² Alan Palmer, *Bismarck* (New York, 1976), p. 110.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 156.

⁴ Lawrence Wilson, *The Imperial Kaiser* (New York, 1963), p. 87-88.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

fundamental difference between the two approaches was that Bismarck had limited, usually domestic, aims, while William had virtually unlimited goals of a German Empire. The consequences of these differences were dire, both for Germany and Europe.

The first thing one notices in any study of Bismarck is his stunning willingness to do whatever it took to gain and expand his power. Judging Bismarck's willingness to adopt revolutionary measures at the drop of a hat, Otto Pflanze called him "this amazing man."⁶ For example, it appears Bismarck was perfectly willing to ignite nationalist revolutions all over Europe if it meant gaining an advantage over France after the Seven Weeks War.⁷ Once Prussia achieved dominance within Germany, his aim was a peace that would support a status quo that so favored Germany. Before that point, Bismarck had to secure that power, and he was willing to do almost anything to achieve his primary task of the extension of Prussian power within Europe. Extending Prussian power within Germany was necessary before any more increase in power could be hoped for. Bismarck felt it necessary to make Prussian power synonymous with German power.⁸

The Germany that Bismarck conceived of was a greater Prussia, hidden under layers of German nationalism.⁹ The way Bismarck decided to achieve this was a war with the other great German state, Austria. A victory over Austria could bring Bismarck several important benefits. First of all, a successful campaign would help make Bismarck more secure politically within Prussia.¹⁰ Secondly, the war would unite the Prussian people behind the state, even if they were opposed to the war at the outbreak.¹¹ Thirdly, the war would force Austria out of her position of German leadership and unite at least the northern German states under Prussian leadership, in the form of the North German Confederation.¹² Finally, the war would help Bismarck to overcome liberal opposition within Prussia.¹³ His calls for German nationalism had been designed to appeal to the liberal desire for national power.¹⁴ It was victory against Austria which gave Bismarck complete control over the liberals with Prussia.¹⁵

⁶ Otto Pflanze, *Bismarck and the Development of Germany* (Princeton, 1963), p. 306.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 308.

⁸ "The interests of Prussia and Germany were identical." *Ibid.*, p. 298.

⁹ Michael Stürmer, *The German Empire*, (New York, 2000), p. 8.

¹⁰ Palmer, *Bismarck*, p. 116.

¹¹ Pflanze, *Bismarck*, p. 321.

¹² William L. Langer, *European Alliances and Alignments: 1871 - 1890*, (New York, 1931), p. 4.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 322.

¹⁴ Palmer, *Bismarck*, p. 112.

¹⁵ Frederic B. M. Hollyday, ed., *Bismarck*, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1970), p. 124

Bismarck's skill at controlling foreign affairs is demonstrated by his manipulation of events to start the war with Austria. Bismarck put constant pressure on the Austrian soldiers occupying Schleswig-Holstein, hoping to force a provocation which could lead to war.¹⁶ He was determined, though, not to be considered the antagonist by European opinion in any conflict he instigated: it was actually Italian troops which provoked Franz Joseph into ordering Austrian mobilization, the start of the Seven Weeks War.¹⁷ Bismarck realized that, considering her exposed and geographically central position in Europe, Prussia would be certainly defeated by a coalition of European powers if she appeared to be the aggressor in a major conflict. To prevent this, Bismarck applied all of his skill to ensure that Prussia seemed the victim. Furthermore, Bismarck kept his demands small: because he limited his expansion to just northern Germany, at least for the moment, the European powers were inclined to allow him to reorganize Germany as he pleased.¹⁸ This was skill which would be sadly lacking when Kaiser William II was responsible for Germany's foreign affairs.

Another example of Bismarck's manipulation of foreign affairs is the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. In fact, it was a Prussian conflict in name alone; the Germany that emerged after the Seven Weeks War was essentially the same as the one which developed in 1871.¹⁹ It required only the addition of the annexed territories of Alsace and Lorraine and the complete absorption of the southern states. The war with France would bring these developments about.

Even though he engineered the war with France and Austria, Bismarck did not usually want to go to war; they were too dangerous and unpredictable for his taste.²⁰ The slow defeat of France bears out his fears: defeating Napoleon's forces took only a month, while defeating all of France took another six. Still, Bismarck achieved what he desired from the war he so delicately provoked. Inciting the war was indeed a subtle operation, owing to William's concession to the French minister over Germany's role in the accession of the next Spanish monarch.²¹ However, Bismarck used the infamous Ems telegram to its doctored best to create patriotic hysteria in Paris so great as to force the French government into a war it did not want.²² He was quite successful at making France seem the aggressor; English public opinion was firmly against France when the

¹⁶ Palmer, *Bismarck*, p. 111.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 115.

¹⁸ Langer, *European Alliances*, p. 7.

¹⁹ Stürmer, *The German Empire*, p. 22.

²⁰ Hollyday, *Bismarck*, p. 7.

²¹ Pflanze, *Bismarck*, p. 454.

²² Palmer, *Bismarck*, p. 145.

war broke out, thinking the conflict was engineered by Napoleon III to reestablish French dominance on the continent and to expand French influence into Germany.²³

Much can be seen of Bismarck's essentially limited goals in his reasoning for pressing the Hohenzollern candidate for the Spanish throne. A government friendly to Prussia would force France to better defend its southern border from at least the threat of Spanish intervention, limiting France's freedom of movement in planning any assault on Germany.²⁴ Bismarck's goal was not to achieve conquest of France; any military victories were incidental in Bismarck's greater aim of inducing the southern states to voluntarily join the northern states in a greater German confederation.²⁵ It was not that Bismarck ignored the handling of the war; on the contrary, he managed to obtain from William an order that the military must not enter any peace negotiations, nor undertake further military operations, without either his or the King's knowledge and approval.²⁶ For Bismarck, though, there were other concerns which were, on the whole, simply more important than defeating the French military (a fact the military command never could understand). The war was simply a means to an end, and as long as the means went well, the ends he sought could be assured. Bismarck used the war to fuse Germany into a single national unit under the control of Prussia, which was under the control of Bismarck.²⁷ As a shared sense of danger tends to do, the war brought the people closer together. Soldiers from the southern states and the northern ones fought together against the French enemy; villages on both sides of the Main celebrated victory.²⁸ After the battle of Sedan, it was not a question of whether or not the Second Reich would be proclaimed, but only what form it would take.²⁹ This was Bismarck's highest aim in the war, and every consideration took second place to it. Meeting this aim meant Bismarck had to carefully manipulate the Prussian government, especially its monarch.

Bismarck's relationship with the first Kaiser, William I, had not always been particularly friendly, but it was effective. William had, for example, helped Bismarck win his conflict with the Prussian High Command during the Franco-Prussian war. Usually, though, the relationship had been stormier. William had been against the war with

²³ Langer, *European Alliances*, p. 9.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

²⁵ Pflanze, *Bismarck*, p. 480.

²⁶ Palmer, *Bismarck*, p. 161.

²⁷ Stürmer, *The German Empire*, p. 23.

²⁸ Pflanze, *Bismarck*, p. 481.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 481.

Austria.³⁰ He had fought against Leopold's candidacy for the Spanish throne that Bismarck had hoped to use against the French.³¹ There had been a serious argument over whether the new emperor would be called the "German Kaiser" or the "Kaiser of Germany," a dispute so severe that William considered abdication and, after the ceremony (during which he was addressed simply as "Kaiser William"), the new Kaiser refused to shake Bismarck's hand.³² On the whole, though, William I was less a decision-making factor in German government than an obstruction that Bismarck was more or less always able to manipulate into following his line of thinking. William I's successor, Frederick III, was a different story, and it was not clear what Bismarck's position would have been under him had Frederick not died within four months.³³

Bismarck's relationship with William II, though, was clearly of a completely different nature than the Chancellor's relationship had been with the new Kaiser's grandfather. Like Bismarck, the third Kaiser was demanding and wanted power. William II, in Alan Palmer's words, "looked upon himself as the adjutant-general to the Almighty."³⁴ It would have been difficult for Bismarck in his prime to deal with this man who was touchy, boastful, uncertain, and easily excited.³⁵ But for Bismarck, his time was past. After losing the argumentative loyalty of the man he had made Kaiser, Bismarck had become only "a monument to his own past."³⁶ This did not mean that contemporaries thought Bismarck to be past his prime when he was dismissed; Bismarck had been the epicenter of European diplomacy for twenty years, and his removal from office was a shock.³⁷ William II thought of himself as the next Frederick the Great, and Frederick could never have kept a chancellor who ignored his commands and disrupted his plans.³⁸ The true cause for Bismarck's dismissal was the familiar line when any two colossal egos meet: the government was not big enough for the two of them. The two had argued over the Kaiser's role in the Ruhr coal miner's strike; Bismarck had been upset over William's disregard of the constitution (!) and protocol.³⁹ Bismarck's style of government and William II's personality made it unlikely the two could ever effectively work together. Bismarck's general plan when

³⁰ Palmer, *Bismarck*, p. 109.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 141.

³² Pflanze, *Bismarck*, p. 496-97.

³³ Hollyday, *Bismarck*, p. 4.

³⁴ Palmer, *Bismarck*, p. 268.

³⁵ Virginia Cowles, *The Kaiser*, (London, 1963), p. 238.

³⁶ Stürmer, *The German Empire*, p. 41.

³⁷ William L. Langer, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism*, Vol. I, (New York, 1935), p. 3.

³⁸ Wilson, *Imperial Kaiser*, p. 48.

³⁹ Palmer, *Bismarck*, p. 247.

confronted with opposition was to crush it, clearly not an effective strategy when the opposition came from the head of state. William's personality, too, was antithetical to Bismarck's.

The personality of the man who would be known simply as "The Kaiser" has been much written about and discussed. He was belligerent, yet timid; he was easily excited, emotional, and he completely lacked the ability to grow, possessing an absolute certainty in his own abilities that kept him from being able to learn from experience.⁴⁰ Furthermore, he was completely intent on matching Bismarck's level of power and authority.⁴¹ From the beginning, the Kaiser insisted on reaching the level of influence of one of the great titans of all time in European history. Clearly, William was a man with big plans for himself. These plans played out disastrously for Germany as the Kaiser became more and more involved in German foreign policy.

Perhaps the most telling example of the Kaiser's foreign policy, both as an example of his foreign policy mishaps and as a judgment of the man, was his policy of naval expansion and the naval race he initiated with Britain. The Kaiser was unwilling to believe that his new navy could endanger relations with the British; on the contrary, he expected it to encourage the British to seek a partnership with him.⁴² Indeed, at first, William's shipbuilding scheme seemed connected with no clear policy.⁴³ None of William's departures from the Bismarckian system seemed to be the result of any specific policy choices; William was just impatient to make his mark.⁴⁴ Apparently, William just liked the idea of a powerful, impressive navy, unconcerned with any possible repercussions on German foreign policy. William most certainly did like big ships; his inspection of the British fleet at Spithead had left quite an impression on the new Kaiser.⁴⁵ For William, the navy was much more glamorous than the army, representing empire and world power while the Prussian, tradition-filled, aristocratic army could only have effect within Europe, a boundary which William increasingly found to be too small.⁴⁶ William enthusiastically supported the new navy, hoping only that it would create friendship and respect for the German Empire worldwide.

William's (perhaps intentional) ignorance of the effect of the expanded High Seas Fleet on British opinion is one of the best examples

⁴⁰ Wilson, *Imperial Kaiser*, p. 49.

⁴¹ Christopher Clark, *Kaiser Wilhelm II*, (Harlow, England, 2000), p. 55.

⁴² Cowles, *Kaiser*, p. 286.

⁴³ Clark, *Wilhelm II*, p. 130.

⁴⁴ Langer, *Diplomacy*, p. 5.

⁴⁵ Wilson, *Imperial Kaiser*, p. 42.

⁴⁶ Clark, *Wilhelm II*, p. 131.

of his inability or unwillingness to develop a coherent foreign policy. From the start, it was obvious that the new, expanded navy meant conflict with Great Britain. The man who was most responsible for planning of the fleet, Admiral von Tirpitz, had said in his 1897 memorandum regarding the expansion of the fleet that "the most dangerous naval enemy at the present time is England."⁴⁷ It cannot be overstated how important the Royal Navy was to British security; no British government would allow Britain's naval superiority to be compromised.⁴⁸ It was, after all, the only defense of Britain's empire and home islands.⁴⁹ As the German Fleet was being expanded with Britain in mind, it was only natural that the British would seek help from Germany's traditional enemy, France.⁵⁰ Once the Germans began threatening the superiority of the Royal Navy which England had so jealously guarded for so long, every German maneuver looked like another attempt at weakening British naval power. Even the German intrigues in Morocco were seen by the British as a threat to the naval base at Gibraltar.⁵¹ When it was definitely decided to expand the High Seas Fleet, rivalry with Britain became a certainty.⁵²

Nothing was more damaging to Anglo-German relations during the naval race than was the contest for Dreadnought superiority. The British, hoping to secure naval superiority once and for all, unwittingly gave the Germans an unparalleled opportunity to match British strength with the introduction of the *Dreadnought*-class battleship.⁵³ While the Germans never were able to match the Royal Navy in Dreadnought production or overall naval strength, the heated naval race did weaken what remained of pro-German sentiment in England.⁵⁴ Moreover, to use the German Navy to expand Germany's colonial empire, as Kaiser William hoped, could only come at the expense of conflict with another power.⁵⁵ William was determined to expand Germany's colonial acquisitions, but more for the purpose of prestige than for any specific economic or political benefits; there were no clear policy aims behind his desires, except for people to think him, and Germany, more powerful. William did not even really want colonial territories; he wanted colonial power.⁵⁶ This, he felt,

⁴⁷ Jonathan Steinberg, *Yesterday's Deterrent*, (New York, 1965), p. 209.

⁴⁸ Cowles, *Kaiser*, p. 250.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 249.

⁵⁰ Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, (New York, 1989), p. 252.

⁵¹ Tyler Whittle, *The Last Kaiser*, (New York, 1977), p. 248.

⁵² Steinberg, *Yesterday's Deterrent*, p. 18.

⁵³ Cowles, *Kaiser*, p. 247.

⁵⁴ Kennedy, *Great Powers*, p. 253.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 213.

⁵⁶ Cowles, *Kaiser*, p. 172.

would make Germany into a world power. As a world power, Germany and, significantly, its Kaiser, would get the respect they deserved. William considered an expanded navy vital to achieving this respect.

It is misleading to call the results of Germany's attempt to reach parity with the Royal Navy "accomplishments." Perhaps the only positive aspect of it was its popularity with the German public; the Naval League at one point had over one million members.⁵⁷ The costs of the naval expansion far outweighed any benefits, though. Building a navy is an expensive thing, and the money almost certainly would have been better spent expanding or improving the army than building what would eventually be a useless navy. Expansion of the navy also introduced Germany's first real political competition with Britain, something that had been notably absent under Bismarck.⁵⁸ Bringing Great Britain and France closer together would eventually mean total defeat for Germany during the First World War. It had been quite difficult to accomplish, forcing Britain into the arms of France, but William had managed to do it. Three times Britain had approached Germany with offers to negotiate a possible alliance or diplomatic arrangement, and every time the Germans refused in hopes of a better offer.⁵⁹ William and his advisors had found and repeatedly assaulted, with adept ineptitude, the only single location in the British official mind, with the possible exception of India, which could have made a certain enemy of England: her navy. Finally, for all his naval build-up and hopes for a battleship fleet, the Kaiser found that the Allies still maintained an overwhelming naval superiority when war broke out in 1914.⁶⁰

Of course, the threat to Britain's naval superiority was not the only example of William's *weltpolitik* creating tension in international affairs. His foray into African colonialism, intended to earn respect and raise Germany's status in Africa, also weakened Germany's international position and drove France and England closer together. The first Moroccan Crisis demonstrated just how far Germany's diplomatic influence had dropped since Bismarck, even as German military and industrial strength had grown.⁶¹ The plan behind William's trip to Tangier was to weaken the new friendship between France and Britain.⁶² At first, William's bellicose speech supporting the Sultan appeared to produce a

⁵⁷ J. C. G. Röhl, *Germany Without Bismarck*, (Berkley, 1967), p. 255.

⁵⁸ Steinberg, *Yesterday's Deterrent*, p. 203.

⁵⁹ Cowles, *Kaiser*, p. 170.

⁶⁰ Kennedy, *Great Powers*, p. 259.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 254.

⁶² Cowles, *Kaiser*, p. 209.

mild diplomatic triumph, with Britain not directly intervening.⁶³ The Sultan called for an international conference; the Germans, unwilling to be content with their success thus far, pressured the French into attending. The conference was a disaster, with all the other powers voting against Germany, making it clear that Germany could now only count on the support of Austria.⁶⁴

One might be forgiven for assuming that at this point, after what was becoming a series of diplomatic defeats and international embarrassments (the Kruger telegram, the *Daily Telegraph* interview, the first Moroccan Crisis), William would consider allowing his advisors more control and discretely have backed away from foreign affairs.⁶⁵ On the contrary, William managed to make virtually the exact same mistake twice, only the second time, to make the effects of the error even greater. Although the Algeiras convention had brought Great Britain and France closer together, there was reason for hope that the friendship would not last. The French Prime Minister Callaux was said to be opposed to the Entente with England, and French Foreign Secretary Cruppi had been pushing for a Franco-German effort towards a Congo-Cameroon railway plan.⁶⁶ The British, too, were eager to avoid seeing Europe divide into two hostile camps. Still, when the chance for peace was there, William chose the option that he felt would earn Germany the most prestige. He went ahead with sending a gunboat, the aging *Panther*, symbolizing for the British Germany's intent to stay in Morocco.⁶⁷ The maneuver was difficult for some of the German ministers, too; while Bethmann Hollweg did not want to see Germany lose influence in North Africa, most of the time during the crisis he was just confused about exactly what was going on and why.⁶⁸ Britain clearly intervened on the side of the French this time, and all the Germans got for their efforts were large areas of useless land in the Congo.⁶⁹ This, combined with the German refusal to accept modest British concessions in exchange for a naval agreement, almost certainly meant that no Western power would support German aims in the near future. After naval talks failed, Britain and France reached on agreement on cooperative naval arrangements.⁷⁰ Britain's squadrons in the Mediterranean were moved to the North Sea, apparently defending the

⁶³ Clark, *Wilhelm II*, p. 143.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 144.

⁶⁵ Wilson, *Imperial Kaiser*, p. 119.

⁶⁶ Cowles, *Kaiser*, p. 290.

⁶⁷ Wilson, *Imperial Kaiser*, p. 129.

⁶⁸ Whittle, *Last Kaiser*, p. 247.

⁶⁹ Clark, *Wilhelm II*, p. 145.

⁷⁰ Wilson, *Imperial Kaiser*, p. 131.

northern French coast, and French ships were sent to the Mediterranean to replace the transferred British ships. While there was no written agreement, it was now obvious that Britain was intent on defending the French coast of the English Channel. Bethmann had been obsessed by the idea of a neutral England, a goal that was now hopeless.⁷¹

Bethmann's inability to implement the policies he sought was typical of all of the post-Bismarckian chancellors. Caprivi was simply not as capable a chancellor as Bismarck, and when he began disagreeing with the Kaiser, especially over naval expansion, he was left more or less helpless.⁷² An indication of how much difficulty he had replacing Bismarck and dealing with Kaiser William can be inferred from Caprivi's ten offers to resign during only four and a half years in office.⁷³ While Hohenlohe agreed to naval expansion, his calls for moderation infuriated the Kaiser.⁷⁴ He finally resigned in 1900 when he realized that he had fallen out of the Kaiser's favor and was accomplishing nothing.⁷⁵

The scheming Bülow was a different case. He held office for twelve years and in some instances appeared to influence the Kaiser's decision making. His disapproval had helped to make a Russian treaty impossible, a decision that insulted William and planted in the Kaiser's mind the idea that his Chancellor was plotting against him.⁷⁶ It was Bülow (although acting on Holstein's wishes) who had convinced the Kaiser to land in Tangier against his wishes, prompting the first Moroccan Crisis.⁷⁷ It was finally the *Daily Telegraph* interview and Bülow's insufficient (at least in the Kaiser's eyes) defense of William's actions that sealed Bülow's fate, although the occasion used to justify the dismissal at the time was Bülow's failure to pass the Finance Reform Bill.⁷⁸ The Kaiser's final selection of chancellor was Bethmann Hollweg, who would eventually see the country into World War I.

Bethmann Hollweg deserves special attention as the Kaiser's last chancellor and as the one who would be holding office when World War I began. It is a bit ironic that it would be Bethmann who would be in power when war with Britain broke out, because to a degree unparalleled by any other chancellor Bethmann was obsessed with British neutrality,

⁷¹ Konrad H. Jarausch, *The Enigmatic Chancellor*, (New Haven and London, 1973), p. 115.

⁷² Whittle, *Last Kaiser*, p. 142.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 173.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 190.

⁷⁶ Wilson, *Imperial Kaiser*, p. 99-100.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 105-106.

⁷⁸ Cowles, *Kaiser*, p. 270, 277.

to the point that he would refuse more moderate concessions.⁷⁹ He had been against sending ships to Morocco in 1911, lest it upset the other powers, especially with regard to British opinion, but had finally felt that he had no other choice in the matter.⁸⁰ As he argued during the naval negotiations of 1912, he was certain that any war against France, especially a preventative attack, would mean war with Russia and almost certainly Britain too.⁸¹

And that war should start in Balkans must have been a severe disappointment too; Bethmann had worked "tirelessly" towards a compromise between Austro-Hungary and Russia over Serbia.⁸² Bethmann, for all his lack of experience in foreign affairs, seemed a much more farsighted diplomat than his monarch: in 1914 he told Prince Lichnowsky that unless Germany and Britain guaranteed European peace, any conflict between Austria and Russia could start a full-scale European war.⁸³ The Kaiser, though, was not as concerned with peace as he was indignant, appalled at the regicide that had occurred, and insisted upon the "blank check" offered to Austria. Bethmann did not resist.⁸⁴ Despite all of his attempts at peace, Bethmann had to do as his Kaiser wished. A sentence written about Bülow, "the suit made for Bismarck was several sizes too big for him," was one easily applied to all of the Kaiser's post-Bismarckian chancellors.⁸⁵ Following in the footsteps of a giant of international diplomacy and dealing with the oversized ego of William II would have been trying for anyone, and it was especially taxing for the four mediocrities that William sought to replace Bismarck with. William himself, with no consistently strong chancellor to guide him and seeking to match Bismarck, was left free to lead Germany's foreign policy tottering on the edge of the precipice, and then to push it over the edge.

Historians have discussed William's role in the outbreak of war in 1914 and Germany's war guilt since the end of the war. The debate has ranged over the importance of Germany's "blank check" to Austria, whether or not Germany intended to start a world war, the importance of the Schlieffen Plan, what Germany's war aims were, and various other issues. However, as far as his role in the outcome of the war, one thing is

⁷⁹ Jarausch, *Enigmatic Chancellor*, p. 115.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 121.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 129.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 136.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 143.

⁸⁴ Cowles, *Kaiser*, p. 313.

⁸⁵ Wilson, *Imperial Kaiser*, p. 108.

clear: Germany's defeat by the Allied powers can be seen as the direct result of William's policy. Lawrence Wilson and many historians who are willing to agree with the idea go so far as to blame the outbreak of the war directly on William's policies. An encircled Germany, isolated as a result of the Kaiser's bumbling and bellicose foreign policy, had to support its only remaining ally, the unstable Austro-Hungarian Empire.⁸⁶ While it seems that Wilson and other historians making similar claims overstate the argument a bit more than the evidence bears out, William's foreign policy had isolated Germany from virtually all of Europe. The Kaiser had Germany on the opposing end of at least a three-power alliance, a degree of isolation that would have been considered unthinkable, indeed outrageous, under Bismarck. Whether or not the Kaiser was responsible for the First World War is, in many ways, irrelevant; what is important is that at almost any time during his reign, should a war break out, Germany would almost certainly be on the weaker side. While the Kaiser's role in starting the war is debatable, his role in Germany's defeat was almost certainly decisive.

The role of decisive decision maker was one which the Kaiser had always sought to fill the way Bismarck had done so impressively when William was growing up. And indeed, Bismarck's decision-making skills had been remarkable. He accurately predicated that war with Austria would leave Prussia as the sole leader of the remaining German states. Bismarck had skillfully managed the war with France in such a way that, despite all of his efforts to provoke the war, the German people united against perceived Gallic aggression and, in their shared outrage, became a single country. Bismarck had turned Europe into a continent dominated by Germany; Germany, in turn, was dominated by Prussia, which was controlled by its Junker elite, who were controlled by Bismarck, his monarch, and a few Prussian ministers. However, William learned the wrong lesson from Bismarck. He saw only Bismarck's grand status, his capacity for influencing the European diplomatic scene, and his complete control over Germany. He sought to emulate Bismarck's prestige with a feat of his own, a new German High Seas Fleet that he hoped would bring Germany worldwide respect, but instead only brought fear and aversion. William hoped to expand Germany's influence in Africa the same way Bismarck had expanded Prussia's influence in Germany, but instead only dropped Germany from the top of European diplomacy to the very depths of European isolation. Finally, isolated and surrounded, William's

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

Germany found itself trapped between hostile states, eventually defeated because of its political isolation and diplomatic weakness. The difference was Bismarck's essential understanding that limited, domestic goals should be the aim of foreign policy. William saw foreign policy as a grand game, the aim being to gain prestige and exercise power. When he realized that the stakes were much higher than that, if he ever did, it was too late for William to reform his fundamentally flawed concept of foreign policy.

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Fitzgerald at His Worst? : An Analysis of "The Offshore Pirate"

Jessica Kilgore

"Whoring" was Ernest Hemingway's reported epithet for F. Scott Fitzgerald's short fiction (Hemingway 155). Critics, unfortunately, have tended to perpetuate this perspective. Fitzgerald's reputation, with the notable exception of *The Great Gatsby*, suffers from his being considered a writer of "popular" literature. It has become a common prejudice that publishing successfully in a popular venue is something to be shunned: a truly great writer should be above "compromising themselves" artistically for the sake of earning a living. Critics often extend this sentiment to Fitzgerald, who, according to John Kuehl, cannot possibly have written serious literature for the notoriously silly readers of the *Saturday Evening Post*, where many of Fitzgerald's stories were published (3). To assert that Fitzgerald wrote artistically inept short fiction just to pay the bills does him a serious injustice, however. While the surface of such stories is often "artificial" (Piper 68), further probing uncovers Fitzgerald's own serious investigations.

"The Offshore Pirate" is one of Fitzgerald's most villainized, even ridiculed, stories. Its plot is admittedly sensational: a spoiled rich girl lives a life of luxury on her uncle's yacht, until she is captured by a pirate who turns out to be the man of her dreams. James Miller sums up critical opinion of the story by calling it "an escape for . . . bored five-and-ten-cent-store clerks who dreamed of being glamorous" (52). At best, this story and many others in Fitzgerald's 1920 collection *Flappers and Philosophers* are condescendingly called "interesting" for "what they reveal about Fitzgerald's early handling of character" (Lehan 5). Such criticisms are blinded by the surface glitter of these stories. "The Offshore Pirate" may always be used as an example of Fitzgerald at his most inept, but in fact the story deals on a complex level with the conflicts facing women in the increasingly modern world of 1920. For the flapper heroines throughout Fitzgerald's fiction, life is a constant struggle between the new morality centered around the Nineteenth Amendment and changing social standards, which encouraged women to be independent individuals, and the traditions of the masculine world that forced them back into traditional roles. Fitzgerald explores these tensions throughout *Flappers and Philosophers*, but most extensively in "The Offshore Pirate." From its selected vantage point as the first story in the volume, "The Offshore Pirate" sets the tone for the other six stories that

follow, and it establishes a pattern that critics have overlooked. "The Offshore Pirate" is no mere flapper trifle; rather it is a genuine and deliberate presentation of the issues women faced in the newly reordered world of the 1920's—marriage, family, economic choice, and the problems caused by the inevitable conflict with the masculine world.

"The Offshore Pirate" opens on a yacht, an image with great weight throughout the story. It is helpful in approaching this image to first consider, briefly, Fitzgerald's use of the yacht in *The Great Gatsby*. When the impoverished James Gatz spied a yacht near the shore of Lake Superior, it "represented all the beauty and glamour in the world" (Fitzgerald, *The Great Gatsby* 106), much like it would to the readers of Fitzgerald's tales. The yacht is more than a symbol for Gatz, though, it is an opportunity. James Gatz is reborn on Dan Cody's yacht, emerging from this world of luxury as the sophisticated Jay Gatsby. Fitzgerald deliberately locates this now-famous transformation on a yacht; it was not an arbitrary gesture. To the privileged, America in the 1920's was a world of new money and immense luxury, and a yacht became a quintessential status symbol, distinguishing real wealth from mere pretense. Other literature of the decade supports this trend. Edith Wharton's novel *The Age of Innocence*, published in 1920, contains a description of a wealthy man's scandalous cruise in a steam-yacht "built in the Clyde, and fitted with tiled bath-rooms and other unheard-of luxuries, [which] was said to have cost him half a million" (Wharton 210). Clearly, the boating world in the 20's was a playground for the *nouveau riche* of the decade, a trend that became *de rigueur* as the decade progressed. Perhaps a more illuminating example is the list of viewers stationed on their private yachts as spectators of the America's Cup yacht race in 1920, which included J. P. Morgan, Vincent Astor, George Gould, Henry Ford, and William Vanderbilt, among others ("The America's Cup"). These men were millionaires many times over, and many of them were also so-called self-made men. As J.P. Morgan himself is reported to have said, "Any man who has to ask about the annual upkeep of a yacht can't afford one" (qtd. in Robinson 201). Yachting was an exclusive "old boy's club." To these men, as to Gatsby, a yacht constituted the most appropriate place to be educated about the ways of the world, and the social site that separates the merely rich from the extraordinarily wealthy. The most extreme case of this is embodied in the story of M. Bayard Brown, an eccentric who lived on his yacht for over twenty years. He alternated between throwing handfuls of his money overboard and giving it lavishly to the flock of local citizens who hounded him for money ("Yacht his Castle"). It is possible that Fitzgerald used his noted extravagance and rumored disappointment in love as a source for Gatsby,

his exotic parties, and his doomed pursuit of Daisy Fay Buchanan.

Using *The Great Gatsby* as a touchstone to explain Fitzgerald's understanding of the yacht helps to clarify the image's importance and significance in "The Offshore Pirate." For Ardita Farnam, the female main character, the yacht is at once an escape from an affluent but oppressive society and an opulent trap in itself. Her uncle's yacht is purchased by, sailed by, and dominated by the presence of her uncle and his exclusively male crew. Not only the composition of the crew but also the lore of the sailor stacks up against Ardita, who is trespassing on a world where for centuries women were not allowed. She is the sole female character in both in this man's world and in the story, trapped by "the golden collar" formed by the sunlight on the water as it moves toward sunset (1). This striking, signature image undermines the idea that the yacht represents freedom, mobility, a carefree lifestyle, or liberation. The golden collar traps even the boat itself, limiting its power. Despite the expectation of limitless adventure and travel, the yacht is curtailed in its range of motion. The collar may be golden, but it is an image of restriction nonetheless, and no matter how luxurious Ardita's surroundings, her freedom in such an environment can never truly take place.

Despite these factors, Ardita manages a measure of independence on the yacht that is not available elsewhere. She demonstrates this freedom by refusing to go ashore with her uncle to a dinner party. Her uncle dismisses this behavior as "selfish, spoiled, uncontrolled" (6), but Ardita's petulance is her only available autonomous gesture: passive resistance. She tells her uncle that she will not "set foot in any . . . darn old town in this crazy state" (3) except Palm Beach, where she plans to meet the man she wants to marry against her uncle's wishes. The boat in its very insularity protects Ardita against a world from which she wishes to withdraw. It functions as a sort of floating palace, not unlike Gatsby's own mansion. Until she can improve on her circumstances, which she intends to do by marriage, Ardita can successfully stalemate her uncle's conventional plans for her by remaining confined in this isolated one-on-one environment. He can threaten her in whatever way he chooses, but, as the opening scenes prove, he cannot force her to go ashore. She is, however, bound to the yacht. Even when the chance arises, Ardita is not yet ready to leave the protection of the yacht. She blatantly tells the "pirate," actually the same Toby Moreland her uncle wishes her to marry, that "You can't get me off this yacht" (10), even as she also acknowledges "'Tisn't my yacht" (11). She is still in the protective enclosure of her uncle's world, outlined by his wealth, social power, and personal property, which both dominate and protect her through their attributes.

The pirates commandeer the yacht and "kidnap" Ardita, but she

maintains her independent stance. On their island hideout, Arditá's ability to dive becomes a metaphor for her quest for freedom. Wearing "the one-piece affair that's shocked the natives all along the Atlantic coast" (24), she performs death-defying dives and is unnervingly confident while she is doing so.¹ The "grey walls" of the island (20) thus become the launching point for her most significant form of escape. The cliff ledges enclose Arditá in the smallest physical space, but instead of accepting their enclosure, she simply dives down from the cliffs into the ocean below, astounding Toby with both her physical skills and her daring. Diving thus becomes a link between physical danger, sexual provocation, and mental feats of bravery. While her escapes in the outside world are not so easy, diving also becomes the analogy for her exploits there. Her madcap adventures, both with Toby and before she met him, are likened to "going through the dark with our arms open wide . . . and our feet straight out behind" (29), as she does when diving. These adventures are where Arditá defines or discovers her own freedom, beyond and without the constraints of Toby or her uncle.

There is also a faintly suicidal cast to her diving, especially given that she and Toby dive after dark, when it would be impossible for her to see any rocks or obstructions beneath the surface of the water. Her daring is designed to push the limits of her freedom, and she is willing to take any risk necessary to prove herself. Toby's view of Arditá's diving is slightly different, and by comparison more conventional. His imagination cannot grasp Arditá's diving for the method of escape that it is. He simply does not understand her need to put her life in danger as she does. Instead, he fears that she will "break [her] back" and warns her "better not dive from there" (29). This is symptomatic of Toby's desires for her to be more enclosed. The freedom that she has gained through the lack of social rules on the island goes against the grain of his ideal, which is a clearly more docile woman than Arditá. He may be masquerading as a bold and fearless pirate, but her diving scares him. For this reason, he imagines her as "a little poor girl dreaming over a fence" (31), putting her once again into an enclosure. By placing her in this context, Toby can dream of rescuing her and taking her all over the world, removing her from the restrictions of her life. It is in this context that he is most

¹ It is in her diving that Zelda Fitzgerald, identified by critics with Arditá, is the most specifically present. Zelda was noted for attempting exploits that the bravest boys wouldn't try, diving from heights that others "were afraid even to climb" (Taylor 22). Zelda, too, wore a shocking bathing suit, a one piece "flesh-colored, silk jersey" that made her "appear nude from a distance" (Taylor 21). Diving both in the fictional world of the "Offshore Pirate" and in the real world of Zelda's life, is a way toward freedom and a way to escape society.

comfortable with Ardita. He wants to be the instrument of her deliverance, not a witness to her own attempts to gain freedom. This is why her diving frightens him, paradoxically, and why he wishes, finally, to marry her.

Ardita and Toby are ultimately disrupted in their island hideaway, and society returns to play its part. Ardita's attempt to escape her bounds is foiled. As the revenue boat, filled with officers to arrest Toby, pulls into their secluded harbor, real life intervenes. Fitzgerald has designed, though, a marriage parody rather than the expected dramatic scene of Toby's arrest. This becomes the basis for the ultimate pun of the story. The "companionway" of the yacht (38) now functions as the aisle of the church, or rather the "way" to a "companion," with Ardita as the bride. She walks up this aisle until she meets Toby and her uncle, who blesses the arrangement by telling Toby that he is "welcome to her" (39). The vow that Toby makes is to swear that their adventure "was entirely a product of [his] own brain" (39), and Fitzgerald ends the entire story with a kiss, in the same way as a wedding. With this emphasis on companionship, there is an opportunity to interpret this marriage as something that will give Ardita both a degree of equality and a partner in her attempts to foil society.

However, Ardita, for her part, requires a steady stream of Toby's "lies" as a basis for their future happiness. She is attracted to Toby because his created stories provide a way out of her "boring" life (4). Her fear is that once they go ashore, he will revert to the boring boy that she did not want to marry. Ardita does not want him to give up the vivid, creative lifestyle that he has invented just because they return to shore. Again, Ardita has a similarity with Zelda, who requires a steady stream of Fitzgerald's fiction, or "lies," both in order to provide the financial security that she deems a prerequisite for marriage and to allow for the uninhibited lifestyle that was her trademark even before she left Montgomery. A girl who wears a swimsuit designed expressly to connote the idea of nudity will simply not be happy in a staid and conventional marriage. This at last dispels the most negative readings of Ardita, since no matter how the Fitzgeralds' marriage ended, at this point the two of them, married only weeks after "The Offshore Pirate" was published, were very much in love.

Ardita, though symbolically married to Toby at the end of the story, is consistently described as childish. Indeed, throughout the story Ardita is called "a supreme egotist" (12), and "spoiled" (6), and she is also constantly referred to as "girl." Her own actions seem on one level to substantiate this view. Early in the story she whines about being bored, and her responses to her uncle are consistently childish. Fitzgerald

underscores these points by having Ardita throw her copy of Anatole France's *The Revolt of Angels* at her uncle's head. Conspicuous title aside, even this silly gesture fails, as the book falls nowhere near him. Her own actions seemingly do not square with her depiction of herself as a genuine rebel, and instead make her appear like a recalcitrant little girl. But there is more to Ardita's actions than pure childishness, and a more complex reading makes it clear that beyond Ardita's surface is something far more revolutionary. Ardita is truly enclosed by her society and rebels against it as suits both her imagination and desires. As Fitzgerald says, Ardita rebels from "an intense desire to be herself" (13), rather than from mere convention.

Fitzgerald's unflinching depiction of Ardita's childishness and egotism is grounded in his use of the philosophy of George Santayana, which Fitzgerald knew well (Berman 7). Santayana states that egotism is a mark of a mind that has not yet fallen into the trap of societal thinking. Childishness and egotism go hand in hand because of the child's "deep transcendental isolation" (Santayana 111). Ardita gives voice to this isolation in all of her actions, and Fitzgerald highlights it by saying that "All the men and women that she had ever known were but driftwood on the ripples of her temperament" (13). Ardita is not one to form connections with others, preferring instead to get into "hellish scrapes" in order to express her "utter disregard for other people's opinions" (26-27), thus her love for "prize fights" where she seeks a "manifestation of courage" (27) to fuel her independence. Her "enormous faith" in herself (27) keeps her from forming the bonds with society that her uncle expects of an "utterly devastating debutante" (25). Isolation is what she admires about life on the yacht and the island, and what she desires from her uncle: "Oh can't you just lemme alone for a second?" she asks her uncle in one of their arguments (2). More specifically, though, Ardita wants to get away from "young fools" who "spend their vacuous hours" pursuing her wherever she goes in hopes of gaining her heart (5). It appears that what Ardita has been seeking from her life throughout the story is a way to express her relation to the world on her own terms. Beyond linking childishness to independence, Santayana applauds a long childhood as the only way to extract the maximum learning from life. Without the long childhood, "mankind would have contained nothing but doctrinaires" (Santayana 105), because they would learn nothing new from experience. Ardita takes advantage of this. The family must be careful, however, to avoid dictating lives to children once they can make their own choices. For those old enough to "protect themselves" there is no "profit in obeying" the family (109). Ardita and her uncle make this point clear—as long as her uncle eliminates Ardita's options by trying to "marry her off"

(27), she is determined to rebel in any and every way she can. Once he steps aside and lets her make her own choice, however, she is perfectly willing to marry a man who meets her uncle's approval. Without his interference, she can make an informed decision about her future, rather than a hasty and rebellious gesture at the expense of her future happiness.

With these facts in mind, there are two ways to interpret Ardita's actions. In traditional criticism, Ardita's rebellion is seen as merely melodrama. Further, the entire story is regarded at best as something of a farce, as Alice Hall Petry proposes.² These critics would propose that she does not seek the reality of marriage—she wants a fairy-tale, to be provided for her constant amusement by Toby. To do this, Toby must have both money and imagination, and it is only when both criteria are clearly met that she can accept him. Such views, however, oversimplify Ardita's complex circumstances. At the most basic level, while with her uncle Ardita has two choices. She can either act like a child, or she can act like an adult, a concept that is, given Fitzgerald's understanding of Santayana, replete with conformity. For the twenty-four-year-old Fitzgerald, to be an adult is essentially to bow to the dictates of society, and Ardita, as has been shown, is fundamentally unsuited for the kind of life that society would give her. Her concerns for her future and her desire for personal freedom mandate that she must act in a way to foil her uncle's plans. Moreover, Ardita recognizes that her desires for personal freedom can be met more easily if she proves able to find a partner who has the required depth and breadth of imagination. Only by finding a mate who can match her enormous imagination adventure for adventure can she escape the confines placed on her by the narrowness of her uncle's affluent but utterly clichéd vision for her future.

A suitable partner can both shelter Ardita from the backlash of society and open doors to wider realms of adventure. There are, though, certain standards that need to be met. Her first marriage prospect, to the notorious libertine, is doomed to fail because it is based solely upon his sexual potency. He is neither the "darn old colonel" nor the "darn young Toby" who Ardita refuses to meet in the opening scenes, but rather a man "notorious for his excesses" and for his chasing of women (3). He is the testing ground upon which Ardita proves that she can do "any darn thing with any darn man [she] want[s] to" (5). Ironically, she seems to be pursuing him as much for his reputation as she is pursued for hers. Ardita claims to appreciate him for his "imagination and the utter

² See Alice Hall Petry 22-27

courage of his convictions" (23), but both of these traits are clearly surpassed by Toby, who gives Ardita a more plausible prospect for freedom. Thus it is through her imagination and her requirement that Toby spend the rest of his life helping her to weave an acceptable fairy tale that Ardita is ultimately freed from the oppressiveness of society. As long as she is married to a man who is willing and able to help her continuously reinvent society, she is able to live at once in the confines of the world and outside of those bounds. She will gain the freedom that a facade of respectability gives, but she and Toby will gleefully continue their rebellious "lie" throughout their marriage. By such means, society will ultimately be foiled.

It is also through Toby's influence that Ardita finally grows up. According to Santayana, in order for a child to overcome its isolation and egotism, "the child must learn to sympathize intelligently . . . rather than instinctively to love and hate; his imagination must become cognitive and dramatically just, instead of remaining . . . selfishly fanciful" (Santayana 111). This is the way in which one grows up and learns to live effectively in society, and it is generally the function of the family to teach such things. Ardita's family has failed, something that she comments on herself, telling her uncle "no child ever has a bad disposition unless it is her family's fault!" (4). According to Santayana, this is probably correct. Because of this failure, she must learn how to adapt to the world from another source. This source is her interaction with Toby. Ardita at the beginning of the story is "selfishly fanciful," listening only to the parts of Toby's story that are amusing to her. Indeed, she falls asleep half way through his tale, and calls it "deathly platonic" (19). She is only interested in "a fabulous story" (14). It is only later that Ardita is able to recognize that "you and I are somewhat alike. We're both rebels—only for different reasons" (25). This ability to "sympathize intelligently" with Toby becomes her passage to freedom once her uncle returns. She can recognize Toby's story as the product of a mind enough like her own to provide everything that she wants in a relationship. Through this, in other words, she gains the ability to escape her bonds.

In no way are the issues addressed in this story the product of a man who was merely pandering to the crowd. Rather, Fitzgerald is giving his readers a story filled with serious implications disguised as something acceptable to the conservative forces of publishing. Ardita is far more than just the "dimwit" (Petty 24) that critics would propose. She is instead a woman who knows what she wants from her life but is frustrated in her attempts to achieve her goal. In this respect, she is much like most women of the 1920's. A decade that is remembered by modern readers as a endless round of parties and illegal liquor also saw the

passage of the Nineteenth Amendment, a rise in the number of women in the workforce, and significant increases in women's education. All across America women were gaining the ability to get what they wanted from life. Ardita is a product of this age, a model of the "new woman" who was not afraid to take the opportunities presented by life and use them to her own advantage. In the end, Ardita's story is one of hope. Her childish resistance to her uncle ultimately becomes something more powerful, and that something gives her the strength to break free. Fitzgerald's story may have the trappings of conventional fiction, but the message is far more revolutionary.

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